In Support of Trigger Strategies: Experimental Evidence from Two-Person Non-Cooperative Games
In Support of Trigger Strategies: Experimental Evidence from Two-Person Non-Cooperative Games
复制标题
支持触发策略：来自两人非合作博弈的实验证据
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.265683
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发表时间：
2001
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Owen R. Phillips
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
C. Mason;Owen R. Phillips
当参与者使用触发策略时，合作均衡可以在重复博弈中得到支持。这篇文章测试了触发策略在两人实验游戏中对行为的解释能力。减少大于古诺水平的选择的收益会导致较小的平均产出，这一行为通常与触发策略模型一致。减少远高于古诺水平的选择的收益不会影响行为，如果行动与涉及更长时间、更不强烈的惩罚阶段的触发策略(严酷-收割者策略)一致，但对于具有短暂但强烈惩罚阶段的触发策略来说，这将是重要的。结果表明，行为与前者最为一致。
Cooperative equilibria can be supported in a repeated game when players use trigger strategies. This paper tests how well trigger strategies explain behavior in two-person experimental games. Reducing payoffs for choices larger than the Cournot level induces smaller average outputs, behavior generally consistent with trigger strategy models. Reducing payoffs for choices well above the Cournot level will not affect behavior if actions are consistent with a trigger strategy involving longer-lived, less intense punishment phases (the grim-reaper strategy), but would matter for trigger strategies with short-lived but intense punishment phases. Results show that behavior is most consistent with the former.
DOI：
--
发表时间：
1986-06
期刊：
The American Economic Review
影响因子：
--
作者：
J. Rotemberg;Garth Saloner
通讯作者：
J. Rotemberg;Garth Saloner
影响因子：
6.1
作者：
ABREU, D
通讯作者：
ABREU, D