SAT-based reverse engineering of gate-level schematics using fault injection and probing
SAT-based reverse engineering of gate-level schematics using fault injection and probing
复制标题
使用故障注入和探测的基于 SAT 的门级原理图逆向工程
DOI：
10.1109/hst.2018.8383918
复制
发表时间：
2018
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Daniel E. Holcomb
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
S. Keshavarz;Falk Schellenberg;Bastian Richter;C. Paar;Daniel E. Holcomb
门隐藏是一种已知的安全增强技术，其试图通过隐藏门的功能或它们之间的连接来阻止逆向工程。许多基于SAT的攻击的工作表明，通过将混淆的电路模型与具有对混淆的组合电路的Oracle访问的能力相结合，通常可以对电路功能进行逆向工程。特别是在小型电路中，很容易以这种方式对电路功能进行逆向工程，但是基于SAT的逆向工程技术不能保证恢复与原始设计等效的逐门电路。在这项工作中，我们表明，一个攻击者谁不知道门功能或连接的一个积极的mascaged电路不能学习正确的门级原理图，即使能够控制输入和探测电路的所有组合节点。然后，我们提出了一个更强大的攻击，扩展了基于SAT的逆向工程与故障分析，让攻击者恢复正确的门级原理图。我们分析我们的逆向工程方法上的S-Box电路。
Gate camouflaging is a known security enhancement technique that tries to thwart reverse engineering by hiding the functions of gates or the connections between them. A number of works on SAT-based attacks have shown that it is often possible to reverse engineer a circuit function by combining a camouflaged circuit model and the ability to have oracle access to the obfuscated combinational circuit. Especially in small circuits it is easy to reverse engineer the circuit function in this way, but SAT-based reverse engineering techniques provide no guarantees of recovering a circuit that is gate-by-gate equivalent to the original design. In this work we show that an attacker who doesn't know gate functions or connections of an aggressively camouflaged circuit cannot learn the correct gate-level schematic even if able to control inputs and probe all combinational nodes of the circuit. We then present a stronger attack that extends SAT-based reverse engineering with fault analysis to allow an attacker to recover the correct gate-level schematic. We analyze our reverse engineering approach on an S-Box circuit.
影响因子：
2
作者：
Wang, Huanyu;Forte, Domenic;Tehranipoor, Mark M.;Shi, Qihang
通讯作者：
Shi, Qihang