Collective decision-making by rational agents with differing preferences
Collective decision-making by rational agents with differing preferences
复制标题
具有不同偏好的理性主体的集体决策
DOI：
10.1073/pnas.2000840117
复制
发表时间：
2020
影响因子：
11.1
通讯作者：
R. Mann
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
R. Mann
对于动物选择在哪里觅食或睡觉，或者对人类选择餐馆、酒店或职业来说，其他人的选择可以提供有用的信息。如果一家餐厅总是挤满了顾客，我们可能会认为它提供的食物一定是高质量的。然而，只有当其他人做出的选择是由具有相似偏好的代理人做出的时，才对我们有用；素食者从牛排馆的受欢迎程度中学到的东西很少。在这篇文章中，我展示了偏好的差异如何改变代理人应该如何相互反应，以最大化他们的个人适应性或效用，从而展示人口结构如何决定社会群体中演变的交互规则。集体决策可以从群体成员之间的个人层面的互动中产生。这些互动通常被视为社会反馈规则，根据这些规则，个人复制他们观察到的其他人所做的决定，从而创建一个连贯的群体决策。这些行为规则对个体代理人的好处可以理解为信息的转移，借此，焦点个体通过获得其他人拥有的信息来了解世界。以前的研究已经通过假设所有代理人都有共同的目标来分析这种信息交换。虽然信息的差异和偏好的差异经常被混为一谈，但关于代理人潜在偏好之间的差异如何影响社会信息的使用和有效性，人们知之甚少。在本文中，我建立了不同偏好的理性主体使用社会信息的模型，并证明了由此产生的集体行为强烈依赖于群体内偏好共享的结构以及环境中的信息质量。特别是，我指出，习惯于嘈杂、不确定环境的个人期待着强烈的社会反应，在这些环境中，关于世界的私人信息相对较弱。此外，通过研究不同的群体结构，我展示了隐蔽的少数群体的潜在影响，这可能揭示个性和领导力之间的经验联系。
Significance For animals choosing where to forage or sleep, or for humans choosing a restaurant, a hotel, or a career, the choices made by others can provide useful information. If a restaurant is consistently full of customers, we might assume it must be serving good-quality food. However, the choices that others make are only useful to us if they are made by agents with similar preferences; a vegan can learn very little from the popularity of a steak house. In this paper, I show how differences in preferences change how agents should respond to each other to maximize their personal fitness or utility, and thus how population structures might determine the interaction rules that evolve in social groups. Collective decisions can emerge from individual-level interactions between members of a group. These interactions are often seen as social feedback rules, whereby individuals copy the decisions they observe others making, creating a coherent group decision. The benefit of these behavioral rules to the individual agent can be understood as a transfer of information, whereby a focal individual learns about the world by gaining access to the information possessed by others. Previous studies have analyzed this exchange of information by assuming that all agents share common goals. While differences in information and differences in preferences have often been conflated, little is known about how differences between agents’ underlying preferences affect the use and efficacy of social information. In this paper, I develop a model of social information use by rational agents with differing preferences, and demonstrate that the resulting collective behavior is strongly dependent on the structure of preference sharing within the group, as well as the quality of information in the environment. In particular, I show that strong social responses are expected by individuals that are habituated to noisy, uncertain environments where private information about the world is relatively weak. Furthermore, by investigating heterogeneous group structures, I demonstrate a potential influence of cryptic minority subgroups that may illuminate the empirical link between personality and leadership.
影响因子：
2.4
作者：
Faria, Jolyon J.;Krause, Stefan;Krause, Jens
通讯作者：
Krause, Jens
影响因子：
2.5
作者：
King, Andrew J.;Sueur, Cedric;Cowlishaw, Guy
通讯作者：
Cowlishaw, Guy
影响因子：
2.5
作者：
Jolles, Jolle W.;King, Andrew J.;Thornton, Alex
通讯作者：
Thornton, Alex