Location Tax/Subsidy Competition: When Governments Set Their Policies After Firms Choose Their Locations
Location Tax/Subsidy Competition: When Governments Set Their Policies After Firms Choose Their Locations
复制标题
选址税/补贴竞争：企业选择选址后政府制定政策
DOI：
10.1080/10168737.2021.1928265
复制
发表时间：
2021
影响因子：
1.1
通讯作者：
Mitsuyoshi Yanagihara
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Kojun Hamada;Yoshitomo Ogawa;Mitsuyoshi Yanagihara
在这项研究中，我们研究了两个国家之间的位置税/补贴竞争时，政府设置的税收或补贴政策后，企业已经决定了他们的位置使用第三市场模型。以前的文献税收竞争与企业的生产地点的选择依赖于一个模型，其中政府制定税收/补贴政策之前，公司选择他们的生产地点之间的国家。然而，如果政府不能提前承诺其政策，决策的时机就会改变，这样政府就可以在企业选择地点之后确定其税率/补贴率。考虑到游戏的不同时间，我们显示了以下结果。首先，公司选择留在它们最初建立的国家，政府补贴位于其国家的公司。结果，出口国陷入过度补贴竞争，而企业可以获得比无补贴情况下更高的利润。第二，当税收/补贴当局是税收收入最大化者时，存在两种不同的税收竞争均衡，其中每个企业选择在不同的国家。当政府是税收最大化者时，社会福利比当政府是社会福利最大化者时更大，而当政府是税收最大化者时，公司的利润更小。
In this study, we examine the location tax/subsidy competition between two countries when governments set tax or subsidy policies after firms have decided their location using a third-market model. The previous literature on tax competition with the choice of production location of firms has relied on a model in which governments set tax/subsidy policies before firms choose their production location between countries. However, if governments cannot commit to their policies in advance, the timing of decision-making changes so that governments determine their tax/subsidy rates after firms choose their location. Considering the different timings of the game, we show the following results. First, firms choose to stay in the countries in which they were originally established and governments subsidize the firms located in their countries. As a result, exporting countries fall into excessive subsidization competition, whereas firms can obtain higher profits than in the no-subsidization case. Second, when tax/subsidy authorities are tax-revenue maximizers, there are two different equilibria in tax competition in which each firm chooses to locate in different countries. Social welfare is larger when governments are tax-revenue maximizers than when they are social-welfare maximizers, whereas firms' profits are smaller when governments are tax-revenue maximizers.
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DOI：
10.1787/67991fc3-en
发表时间：
2020
期刊：
Tax Policy Reforms 2020
影响因子：
--
作者：
N. Lipsman;R. Farb;Osman O. Al;L. Casaubon
通讯作者：
L. Casaubon
贸易政策和市场结构
DOI：
10.2307/2554946
发表时间：
1990
期刊：
Labor: Public Policy & Regulation eJournal
影响因子：
--
作者：
E. Helpman;P. Krugman
通讯作者：
P. Krugman
解决税基侵蚀和利润转移问题
DOI：
10.1787/9789264192744-en
发表时间：
2013
期刊：
The British Tax Review
影响因子：
--
作者：
H. Self
通讯作者：
H. Self
资本所得税能在开放经济中生存吗？
DOI：
10.1111/j.1540-6261.1992.tb04009.x
发表时间：
1990
期刊：
NBER Working Paper Series
影响因子：
--
作者：
R. Gordon
通讯作者：
R. Gordon
影响因子：
9.8
作者：
Haufler, A;Wooton, I
通讯作者：
Wooton, I