When the Dike Breaks: Dissecting DNS Defenses During DDoS

When the Dike Breaks: Dissecting DNS Defenses During DDoS
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当堤坝决堤时:剖析 DDoS 期间的 DNS 防御

DOI:
10.1145/3278532.3278534
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发表时间:
2018
期刊:
ACM Interent Measurements Conference
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
Davids, Marco
Davids, Marco
中科院分区:
--
文献类型:
--
作者:
Moura, Giovane C.;Heidemann, John;Müller, Moritz;de O. Schmidt, Ricardo;Davids, Marco

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互联网的域名系统(DNS)是分布式拒绝服务(DDoS)攻击的常见目标,但这种攻击的结果却截然不同——一些攻击使主要的公共网站瘫痪,而其他攻击的外部影响则微乎其微。一方面,DNS协议相对简单,但该系统有许多可移动的部分,具有多级缓存、重试和复制服务器。本文使用受控实验来研究这些机制如何影响DNS弹性和延迟,探索客户端DNS用户体验和服务器端流量。我们发现,对于大约30%的客户机,缓存是无效的。然而,当缓存满时,它们允许大约一半的客户端度过持续时间少于缓存生命周期的服务器中断,缓存和重试一起允许多达一半的客户端容忍超过缓存生命周期的DDoS攻击,有90%的查询丢失,几乎所有的客户端都容忍导致50%数据包丢失的攻击。虽然客户机可能在攻击期间获得服务,但客户机的尾部延迟会增加。对于服务器来说,DDoS攻击时的重试次数会使正常流量增加8倍。我们关于缓存和重试的发现有助于解释为什么用户会在一些真实的DDoS事件中看到服务中断,而在其他事件中却看不到明显的影响。
The Internet's Domain Name System (DNS) is a frequent target of Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks, but such attacks have had very different outcomes---some attacks have disabled major public websites, while the external effects of other attacks have been minimal. While on one hand the DNS protocol is relatively simple, the system has many moving parts, with multiple levels of caching and retries and replicated servers. This paper uses controlled experiments to examine how these mechanisms affect DNS resilience and latency, exploring both the client side's DNS user experience, and server-side traffic. We find that, for about 30% of clients, caching is not effective. However, when caches are full they allow about half of clients to ride out server outages that last less than cache lifetimes, caching and retries together allow up to half of the clients to tolerate DDoS attacks longer than cache lifetimes, with 90% query loss, and almost all clients to tolerate attacks resulting in 50% packet loss. While clients may get service during an attack, tail-latency increases for clients. For servers, retries during DDoS attacks increase normal traffic up to 8x. Our findings about caching and retries help explain why users see service outages from some real-world DDoS events, but minimal visible effects from others.
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