Explaining Variation in Broker Strategies: A Lab-in-the-Field Experiment in Senegal
Explaining Variation in Broker Strategies: A Lab-in-the-Field Experiment in Senegal
复制标题
解释经纪商策略的变化：塞内加尔的现场实验室实验
DOI：
--
复制
发表时间：
2017
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
J. Gottlieb
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
J. Gottlieb
裙带主义对民主问责的影响是复杂的：经纪人不仅帮助协调选票以获得集体利益，而且还利用自己的地位促进个人利益。我认为，经纪人使用不同的策略-说服、回报和惩罚-来激励选民，这是当地制度背景的一种功能。经过竞争挑选的经纪人，其偏好与追随者的偏好一致，可能更多地依赖于说服，而不是工具诱因。经济上自主的经纪人更有可能依赖制裁，而不是互惠。塞内加尔收集了支持经纪人策略及其决定因素的拟议类型的证据，这是一个裙带主义民主国家，在那里，集团层面的异质性导致经纪人类型的自然变化。与真实经纪人进行的协调博弈表明，当经纪人被竞争性选择时，参与者不太可能牺牲个人利益，而当他们最害怕报复时，更有可能牺牲个人利益。定性数据表明，实验室游戏的结果似乎可以概括为选举中的行为。
The implications of clientelism for democratic accountability are mixed: Brokers not only help coordinate votes for collective gain but also exploit their position to advance personal interest. I argue that brokers use distinct strategies—persuasion, reciprocation, and punishment—to motivate voters as a function of their local institutional context. Competitively selected brokers whose preferences are aligned with those of followers can rely more on persuasion than instrumental inducements. Economically autonomous brokers are more likely to rely on sanctions than reciprocity. Evidence to support both the proposed typology of broker strategies and their determinants is collected in Senegal, a clientelistic democracy where group-level heterogeneity generates natural variation in broker types. A coordination game played with real brokers illustrates that participants are less likely to sacrifice personal gain when brokers are competitively selected, more likely when they most fear retribution. Qualitative data suggest that results from the laboratory game plausibly generalize to behavior in elections.
影响因子：
8.3
作者：
KNEZ, M;CAMERER, C
通讯作者：
CAMERER, C