Dynamic matching in school choice: efficient seat reassignment after late cancellations (invited talk)
Dynamic matching in school choice: efficient seat reassignment after late cancellations (invited talk)
复制标题
择校动态匹配：延迟取消后的高效座位重新分配（特邀演讲）
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.2993375
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发表时间：
2017
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Irene Lo
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Irene Lo
在择校市场上，公立学校名额稀缺，如何重新分配首轮集中分配后空出的名额是一个关键问题。每年，大约 10% 的纽约市公立高中系统分配的学生最终不会使用该座位，他们的空出座位可以重新分配。重新分配问题的实际解决方案必须易于实施、真实且高效。我提出并公理地证明了一类重新分配机制，即排列彩票延期录取（PLDA）机制，它将常用的延期录取（DA）择校机制推广到两轮设置，并保留其理想的激励和效率特性。我还向学区提供指导，指导他们如何在本课程中选择适合其设置的适当机制。集中招生通常采用延期录取的方式在单轮中进行，并通过抽签来打破每所学校对学生优先顺序的束缚。我们提出的 PLDA 机制使用第二轮 DA 重新分配空出的席位，并根据第一轮抽签号码的适当排列进行抽签。我证明，在学生对学校总需求的自然秩序条件下，第二轮平局抽签可以与第一轮抽签任意相关，而不影响分配福利。我还展示了如何选择 PLDA 机制的识别特征及其排列来控制重新分配。在第一轮后空出来的学生会通过分散的候补名单进行重新分配，这会在学年开始后造成大量学生流动，这对学生和学校来说都是昂贵的。我证明，在轮次之间颠倒抽签顺序可以最大限度地减少所有 PLDA 机制之间的重新分配，从而使我们能够减轻学校之间昂贵的学生流动，而不影响最终分配的效率。在没有学校优先事项的情况下，我还将 PLDA 机制描述为一类机制，为学生的第一轮作业提供保证，尊重学校优先事项，并且是策略证明的，受限帕累托效率，并满足一些温和的对称性。最后，我提供了在存在学校优先事项的情况下不同 PLDA 机制的性能模拟。所有模拟的 PLDA 都具有相似的分配效率，而基于逆转轮次之间平局抽签的 PLDA 最大限度地减少了重新分配的学生数量。这些结果支持我们的理论发现。这是基于与 Itai Feigenbaum、Yash Kanoria 和 Jay Sethuraman 的合作。
In the school choice market, where scarce public school seats are assigned to students, a key issue is how to reassign seats that are vacated after an initial round of centralized assignment. Every year around 10% of students assigned a seat in the NYC public high school system eventually do not use it, and their vacated seats can be reassigned. Practical solutions to the reassignment problem must be simple to implement, truthful and efficient. I propose and axiomatically justify a class of reassignment mechanisms, the Per- muted Lottery Deferred Acceptance (PLDA) mechanisms, which generalize the commonly used Deferred Acceptance (DA) school choice mechanism to a two-round setting and retain its desirable in- centive and efficiency properties. I also provide guidance to school districts as to how to choose the appropriate mechanism in this class for their setting. Centralized admissions are typically conducted in a single round using Deferred Acceptance, with a lottery used to break ties in each school’s prioritization of students. Our proposed PLDA mechanisms reassign vacated seats using a second round of DA with a lottery based on a suitable permutation of the first-round lottery numbers. I demonstrate that under a natural order condition on aggregate student demand for schools, the second-round tie-breaking lottery can be correlated arbitrarily with that of the first round without affecting allocative welfare. I also show how the identifying char- acteristic of PLDA mechanisms, their permutation, can be chosen to control reallocation. vacated after the initial round are reassigned using decentralized waitlists that create significant student movement after the start of the school year, which is costly for both students and schools. I show that reversing the lottery order between rounds minimizes reassignment among all PLDA mechanisms, allowing us to alleviate costly student movement between schools without affecting the ef- ficiency of the final allocation. In a setting without school priorities, I also characterize PLDA mechanisms as the class of mechanisms that provide students with a guarantee at their first-round assign- ment, respect school priorities, and are strategy-proof, constrained Pareto efficient, and satisfy some mild symmetry properties. Finally, I provide simulations of the performance of different PLDA mecha- nisms in the presence of school priorities. All simulated PLDAs have similar allocative efficiency, while the PLDA based on reversing the tie-breaking lottery between rounds minimizes the number of reassigned students. These results support our theoretical findings. This is based on joint work with Itai Feigenbaum, Yash Kanoria, and Jay Sethuraman.
影响因子：
6.1
作者：
Agarwal, Nikhil;Somaini, Paulo
通讯作者：
Somaini, Paulo
纽约市高中先修环境科学和恢复科学课程和社区企业 (CCERS) 项目
DOI：
10.5430/jct.v7n1p7
发表时间：
2017
期刊：
Journal of Curriculum and Teaching
影响因子：
--
作者：
Birney, Lauren;McNamara, Denise
通讯作者：
McNamara, Denise