What’s at the top in the top-down control of action? Script-sharing and ‘top-top’ control of action in cognitive experiments
What’s at the top in the top-down control of action? Script-sharing and ‘top-top’ control of action in cognitive experiments
复制标题
认知实验中自上而下的行动控制和“自上而下”的行动控制的顶层是什么？
DOI：
10.1007/s00426-003-0155-4
复制
发表时间：
2004
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
C. Frith
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
A. Roepstorff;C. Frith
自下而上和自上而下的行为控制之间的区别一直是认知心理学的核心，随后也是功能性神经成像的核心。虽然该模型在认知实验中成功地描述了中枢机制，但它在解释自上而下的控制是如何建立的方面存在严重缺陷。特别是，在自上而下的控制中，什么位于顶部的问题会把我们引向一个控制侏儒，它位于一个神话般的大脑区域，有输出，没有输入。最近的脑成像实验的讨论的基础上，我们认为，需要因素之间的相互作用的实验者和实验参与者到一个现实的理解自上而下的控制。我们认为，这些互动涉及到感知和行动的“脚本共享”，可以被描述为“顶级过程”。因此，我们扩展了对侏儒的理解，使之包括社会认知的要素。这种概念上的重新配置可能会为一个并非无所不能的侏儒提供某种庇护。
The distinction between bottom-up and top-down control of action has been central in cognitive psychology, and, subsequently, in functional neuroimaging. While the model has proven successful in describing central mechanisms in cognitive experiments, it has serious shortcomings in explaining how top-down control is established. In particular, questions as to what is at the top in top-down control lead us to a controlling homunculus located in a mythical brain region with outputs and no inputs. Based on a discussion of recent brain imaging experiments, we argue for the need to factor the interaction between the experimenter and the experimental participant into a realistic understanding of top-down control. We suggest these interactions involve a ‘sharing of scripts’ for perception and action that may be described as ‘top-top processes.’ We thereby expand the understanding of the homunculus to include elements of social cognition. This conceptual reconfiguration may grant some sort of asylum for a—not very omnipotent—homunculus.
DOI：
10.1073/pnas.96.9.5268
发表时间：
1999-04-27
影响因子：
11.1
作者：
Nimchinsky, EA;Gilissen, E;Hof, PR
通讯作者：
Hof, PR