Some Economic Consequences of Adverse Selection

交换的一方往往知道一些与交换有关的事情。 交易对方不知道。 这种不对称 在经济活动中，信息是无处不在的：例如， 在雇主与雇员之间的关系中， 员工的努力无法得到完美的监控;保险公司之间 在一个公司的股东和经理之间; 社会主义企业和中央计划者之间;或者 当物品的价值不确定时，买方和卖方。 这 这种情况被称为逆向选择，因为 信息可能导致效率低下的结果。 这个项目 提供了新的见解，一些困难， 逆向选择的未解决问题。 该项目包括五个部分。 首先，它描述了 合同的一个团队的成员，在存在不利的， 选择（每个团队成员的能力只有他自己知道） 道德风险（努力不能被观察到）。 初步 结果表明，最优合同可以设计，其中， 不需要监控来防止团队成员的偷懒。 进一步的研究确定了结果，当一些关键的 简化的假设被放宽。 其次，对投标人进行了分析 戒指，投标人的努力，在重复拍卖串通时， 投标人之间可以转让，也可以不转让。 投标人必须克服信息不对称的问题， 知道对方有多看重这件东西 三是项目 确定销售独特物品的最佳方式， 没有人知道的确定价值（如采矿权）。 第四， 该项目研究分散信息的拍卖 采集 大多数拍卖理论假设信息是 固定，但在实践中，投标人可以获得更昂贵的 信息. 例如，在矿权招标中， 可以进行调查。 第五，项目使用开发的工具 运用拍卖理论对证券市场价格形成进行建模 过程 特定市场制度的影响，如 经销商市场和结算所的确定。

One party to an exchange often knows something relevant to the transaction that the other party does not know. Such asymmetries of information are pervasive in economic activity: for example, in the relationship between employer and employee when the employee's effort cannot be monitored perfectly; between insurer and insured; between the stockholders and the manager of a firm; between a socialist firm and the central planner; or between buyer and seller when the value of the item is uncertain. This situation is called adverse selection because the asymmetries of information can lead to inefficient outcomes. This project provides new insights into a number of difficult and as yet unresolved aspects of adverse selection. The project consists of five parts. First, it characterizes contracts for members of a team in the presence of both adverse selection (each team member's ability is known only to himself) and moral hazard (effort cannot be observed). Preliminary results show that an optimal contract can be designed in which monitoring is not needed to prevent shirking by team members. Further research determines the results when a number of crucial simplifying assumptions are relaxed. Second, it analyzes bidder rings, the efforts of bidders at repeat auctions to collude when bidders either can or cannot make transfers among themselves. Bidders must overcome the asymmetric-information problem of not knowing how much each other values the item. Third, the project determines the best way of selling a unique item with a well- defined value which no one knows (like mineral rights). Fourth, the project studies auctions with decentralized information acquisition. Most auction theory assumes that information is fixed, but, in practice, bidders can acquire more costly information. For example, in mineral-rights bidding, geological surveys can be done. Fifth, the project uses the tools developed in auction theory to model the securities-market price-formation process. The effects of particular market institutions like the dealership market and the clearing house are determined.