Coordination Issues in Industrial Organization

协调问题对消费者和企业都很重要。消费者可能希望在选择光顾哪个公司时进行协调，特别是在生产技术具有规模经济特征的情况下。现有企业可能会认识到在威慑进入方面的协调所带来的收益。特别是，如果现有公司（与潜在进入者相比）对进入的盈利能力有更好的信息，那么他们协调信号选择（例如价格）的能力就变得相当重要。大多数先前的工作都忽略了协调问题，假设消费者以一种简单的方式行事，并且有一家现有的公司试图阻止进入。首先，本项目发展并扩展了一种新的非信息性广告理论，即在存在规模经济且价格信息难以沟通的情况下，使用明显浪费的广告来协调消费者购买。该分析为观察到的零售广告、现有的经验难题和新游戏提供了见解。理论方法。该项目还从经验上探讨了非。价格广告降低了价格。第二，缺乏准确价格信息的消费者可能会通过抵制以前行使垄断权力的公司来限制垄断定价。消费者可信地协调抵制的能力将取决于规模经济的方向。这项工作提出了规模经济和垄断力量之间迄今未被探索的联系。最后，该项目检查企业之间的协调。当一个进入者使用企业的价格作为进入的盈利能力的信号时，在位企业将希望协调信号的选择。无法协调将导致没有价格扭曲的信号均衡。这种分析逆转了以前的单一在位者预测，并构成了向多信号发送者模型的方法论进步。这是一个令人兴奋的项目，它为工业组织中广泛的实质性问题提供了新的见解，并提高了我们对企业和消费者在市场中协调行动的方式的理解。该项目在实质上和方法上有助于我们理解零售广告、消费者抵制作为限制垄断力量的一种手段以及特定行业中多家公司的进入威慑。

Issues of coordination are important to consumers and firms. Consumers may wish to coordinate on their selection of which firm to patronize, especially if economies of scale characterize the production technology. Incumbent firms may recognize gains from coordination in the deterrence of entry. In particular if incumbent firms have superior information (as compared to a potential entrant) about the profitability of entry, then their ability to coordinate the selection of signals (prices, for example) become quite important. Most previous work has ignored the issue of coordination, by assuming that consumers act in a simple fashion and that a single incumbent firm attempts to deter entry. First, this project develops and extends a new theory of non.informative advertising, in which apparently wasteful advertisements are used to coordinate consumer purchases when economies of scale exist and price information is difficult to communicate. The analysis provides insight into observed retail advertisements, existing empirical puzzles, and a new game.theoretic methodology. The project also explores empirically the extent to which non.price advertising lowers prices. Second, consumers lacking precise price information may nevertheless restrain monopoly pricing by boycotting firms that have previously exercised monopoly power. The ability of consumers to credibility coordinate a boycott will be shown to depend on the direction of scale economies. This work draws a heretofore unexplored connection between scale economies and monopoly power. Finally, the project examines coordination among firms. When an entrant uses firms' prices as signals of the profitability of entry, incumbent firms will wish to coordinate the selection of signals. The inability to coordinate will result in signaling equilibria that involve no distortion in price. This analysis reverses previous single incumbent predictions and constitutes a methodological advance into multiple.signal.sender models. This is an exciting project that provides new insights into a wide range of substantive issues in industrial organization as well as improving our understanding of the way firms and consumers coordinate their actions in markets. The project contributes substantively and methodological to our understanding of retail advertising, consumer boycotts as a means of restraining monopoly power and entry deterrence by multiple firms in a given industry.