Coordination Issues in Industrial Organization

产业组织的协调问题

• 批准号: 8909856
• 负责人: Kyle Bagwell
• 金额: $ 4.04万
• 依托单位: Northwestern University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 1989
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 1989-08-15 至 1992-07-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=8909856&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Coordination; Issues; Industrial; Organization

Issues of coordination are important to consumers and firms. Consumers may wish to coordinate on their selection of which firm to patronize, especially if economies of scale characterize the production technology. Incumbent firms may recognize gains from coordination in the deterrence of entry. In particular if incumbent firms have superior information (as compared to a potential entrant) about the profitability of entry, then their ability to coordinate the selection of signals (prices, for example) become quite important. Most previous work has ignored the issue of coordination, by assuming that consumers act in a simple fashion and that a single incumbent firm attempts to deter entry. First, this project develops and extends a new theory of non.informative advertising, in which apparently wasteful advertisements are used to coordinate consumer purchases when economies of scale exist and price information is difficult to communicate. The analysis provides insight into observed retail advertisements, existing empirical puzzles, and a new game.theoretic methodology. The project also explores empirically the extent to which non.price advertising lowers prices. Second, consumers lacking precise price information may nevertheless restrain monopoly pricing by boycotting firms that have previously exercised monopoly power. The ability of consumers to credibility coordinate a boycott will be shown to depend on the direction of scale economies. This work draws a heretofore unexplored connection between scale economies and monopoly power. Finally, the project examines coordination among firms. When an entrant uses firms' prices as signals of the profitability of entry, incumbent firms will wish to coordinate the selection of signals. The inability to coordinate will result in signaling equilibria that involve no distortion in price. This analysis reverses previous single incumbent predictions and constitutes a methodological advance into multiple.signal.sender models. This is an exciting project that provides new insights into a wide range of substantive issues in industrial organization as well as improving our understanding of the way firms and consumers coordinate their actions in markets. The project contributes substantively and methodological to our understanding of retail advertising, consumer boycotts as a means of restraining monopoly power and entry deterrence by multiple firms in a given industry.

协调问题对消费者和企业都很重要。 消费者可能希望协调他们的选择， 企业赞助，特别是如果规模经济的特点 生产技术。 现有公司可能会承认收益 阻止进入的协调。 特别是如果 在位企业拥有上级信息（与 潜在的进入者）关于进入的盈利能力，那么他们的 协调信号选择的能力（价格， 例如：变得非常重要。 大多数以前的工作都忽略了协调问题， 假设消费者以简单的方式行事， 单一的现有公司试图阻止进入。 首先 项目开发和扩展了一种新的非信息化理论 广告，使用明显浪费的广告 当存在规模经济时， 价格信息很难传达。 分析 提供对观察到的零售广告、现有 经验难题，和一个新的游戏。理论方法论。 的 该项目还从经验上探讨了非价格因素在多大程度上 广告降低了价格。 第二，消费者缺乏准确的价格信息， 然而，通过抵制那些 此前，他们一直在垄断市场。 的能力 消费者以信誉协调抵制将表明， 取决于规模经济的方向。 这部作品吸引了 规模经济与经济增长之间迄今尚未探索的联系， 垄断力量。 最后，该项目审查了 事务所 当一个进入者使用公司的价格作为信号， 进入的盈利能力，现任公司将希望协调 信号的选择。 无法协调意志 导致信号平衡，不涉及失真， 价格 这一分析扭转了以往单一的现任 预测，并构成了方法论的进步， 多个信号发送器型号。 这是一个令人兴奋的项目，提供了新的见解， 工业组织中的广泛实质性问题， 以及提高我们对公司和 消费者在市场上协调他们的行动。 项目 为我们的工作提供了实质性和方法性的贡献， 理解零售广告，消费者抵制作为一种手段 限制垄断力量和进入威慑的多个 特定行业的企业。