Optimal Contracts in Oligopolistic Agency Models with Incomplete Information

不完全信息寡头垄断代理模型中的最优契约

• 批准号: 8922160
• 负责人: Esther Gal-Or
• 金额: $ 7.55万
• 依托单位: University of Pittsburgh
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 1990
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 1990-07-01 至 1992-12-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=8922160&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Optimal; Contracts; Oligopolistic; Agency; Models

The investigator intends to extend the investigation of the principal-agent model in the context of oligopolistic firms that contract with retailers. The retailers provide services to the (oligopolist) firm in the form of advertising, maintenance or the provision of warranties. Because the firm cannot observe the level of effort that the retailer expends, nor does the firm have direct access to information about demand and retailing cost, the problems of moral hazard and adverse selection can be studied. Some important questions in industrial organization are studied in the context of this model. Specifically, it will look at how the form of competition among retailers affects: the willingness of the firms to delegate decisions to the retailers, the incentives of firms to monitor their agents, the marketing efforts of agents and the profits of firms and retailers. In the context of this same model, the issue of vertical restraints are analyzed. The study will see how the restraint selected depends upon the degree of differentiation among products, the relative efficiency of retailers and firms, and the relative precision of the information known only to the retailers.

研究者打算在与零售商签订合同的寡头垄断企业的背景下扩展委托代理模型的调查。零售商以广告、维护或提供保证的形式向（寡头垄断）公司提供服务。由于企业无法观察到零售商花费的努力程度，也无法直接获得有关需求和零售成本的信息，因此可以研究道德风险和逆向选择问题。在这个模型的背景下，研究了产业组织中的一些重要问题。具体来说，它将研究零售商之间的竞争形式如何影响：公司将决策委托给零售商的意愿，公司监督其代理商的动机，代理商的营销努力以及公司和零售商的利润。在同一模型的背景下，对垂直约束问题进行了分析。研究将会看到选择的约束如何取决于产品之间的差异化程度，零售商和公司的相对效率，以及只有零售商知道的信息的相对精确度。