Political Pressure and Fiscal Federalism: A Model of State Mandates on Local Government Expenditures

联邦制的研究传统上研究了某些 商品或服务最好在当地、州或 联邦各级政府。 当地供应不足 在联邦制中，商品和服务的价格可以通过以下方式来解决： 转移当地公众的生产或融资 对上级政府好。 一个很少被讨论的 另一种选择是由更高级别的政府机构实施任务， 政府对下属单位。 任务是数量 对政府下属单位的约束， 增加或减少提供的货物取决于 溢出的方向。 该研究项目开发了一个 联邦制的政治经济模式，侧重于授权。 从实证的角度来看，该模型强调地方和州 政府关系，但它可以很容易地扩展到国家 和联邦关系 该模型进行了实证检验，使用 当地提供的各类货物的支出数据 和服务 该项目的意义在于将政治 地方公共产品的规范经济模型。 分析政府间政策的尝试不可能成功 没有一个积极的财政联邦制模式。 这个项目 迈出了回答非常重要的政策问题的第一步 关于各级政府提供哪些服务的决定因素， 特定商品和分析相互作用的性质 各级政府之间。

Studies in federalism have traditionally examined whether certain goods or services are best provided at the local, state, or federal levels of government. Inefficiencies in local provision of goods and services can be addressed in a federalist system by shifting either the production or financing of the local public good to higher levels of government . A much less discussed alternative is the imposition of mandates by higher levels of government on subordinate units. Mandates are quantity constraints on the subordinate units of government that require an increase or decrease in the provision of the good depending on the direction of the spillover. This research project develops a political economy model of federalism that focuses on mandates. For empirical purposes, the model emphasizes local and state government relationships but it could be easily extended to state and federal relationships. The model is empirically tested using expenditure data for various categories of locally provided goods and services. The significance of this project lies in combining the political process with the normative economic models of local public goods. Attempts to analyze intergovernment policies cannot be successful without a positive model of fiscal federalism. This project takes a first step in answering very important policy questions regarding the determinants of which levels of government provide particular goods and analyzing the nature of the interaction between levels of government.