The Strategic Role of Debt: Can Leverage Influence Bargaining Outcomes?

本项目研究了杠杆在与高级利益相关者重新谈判合同时所起的战略作用。尤其值得一提的是，以债代股使股东（被定义为在投资决策上拥有自由裁量权的初级索赔人）能够与工会进行有利的谈判。其理念是，除非工会对公司的要求重新谈判，否则股权退出与高杠杆结合将可靠地改变股东的事后投资动机。项目的第一部分考虑了一个模型，在这个模型中，公司的盈利能力和投资机会是众所周知的。本文将探讨两种类型的合同重新谈判；在第一种情况下，工资重新谈判，在第二种情况下，工资和债务合同都重新谈判。初步结果表明，只有当未来的投资机会看起来很有希望时，高杠杆才会被选择在利润较低的自然状态下。股东改变公司资本结构的能力导致了风险的低效分配。项目的第二部分涉及扩展基本模型以包含不完全信息。假设股东比其他利益相关者对公司未来的盈利能力和/或投资机会有更好的信息是合理的。债务可能预示着公司的盈利能力。信息不对称将导致谈判破裂，从而导致次优投资决策的低效率。本研究将对我们理解债务的战略性使用和资本结构问题作出重大贡献。

This project investigates the strategic role that leverage plays during the renegotiation of contracts with senior stakeholders. In particular, the substitution of debt for equity allows shareholders, defined as junior claimants with discretion over investment decisions, to bargain advantageously with the union. The notion is that equity withdrawal in combination with high leverage credibly alters the shareholders' ex post incentives to invest unless the union's claim on the firm is renegotiated. The first part of the project considers a model in which the firm's profitability and investment opportunities are commonly known. Two types of contract renegotiation will be explored; in the first wages are renegotiated, and in the second both wage and debt contracts are renegotiated. Preliminary results suggest that high leverage will only be chosen in less profitable states of nature when future investment opportunities appear promising. The shareholders' ability to alter the capital structure of the firm leads to an inefficient allocation of risk. The second part of the project involes extending the basic model to incorporate incomplete information. It is reasonable to suppose that the shareholders have better information than the other stakeholders regarding the firm's future profitability and/or investment opportunities. Debt may then signal the firm's profitability. Informational asymmetries will lead to breakdowns in negotiations, and thus an inefficiency will be generated by suboptimal investment decisions. This research will make a significant contribution to our understanding of the strategic use of debt and the capital structure problem.