No Manipulable and Fair Allocation of Private Goods

这项研究涉及在简单的私人物品情况下的分配，例如计算机网络中的传输容量分配。在这样的问题中，(I)不可操纵性(即主导策略)是非常理想的性质，(Ii)用公平标准取代帕累托效率的要求是明智的--特别是因为效率和不可操纵性是不一致的要求，以及(Iii)如果匿名在全球范围内成立，局部连续独裁是可以接受的。结果表明，序列社会选择函数满足这些准则。这项研究是为了描述满足这些标准的机制的类别。本项目是系统分析分配私人物品的战略防范机制的起点。它代表着一个重要和令人振奋的方向，在这个方向上，我们可以增加对分配机制及其性能特点的了解。该项目不仅承诺对经济理论体系做出实质性贡献，还将影响公司和公共机构分配某些稀缺生产资源的方式(如计算机网络)。

This research concerns allocation in simple private goods situations such as assignment of transmission capacity in a computer network. A strong case can be made that in such problems (i) non manipulability (i.e., dominant strategies) is a very desirable property, (ii) replacing the requirement of Pareto efficiency with a fairness criterion is sensible - particularly since efficiency and non manipulability are inconsistent requirements, and (iii) local serial dictatorship is acceptable provided anonymity holds globally. It has been shown that the serial social choice function satisfies these criteria. This research is to characterize the class of mechanisms that satisfy these criteria. This project is the point of departure for a systematic analysis of strategy-proof mechanisms for allocating private goods. It represents an important and exciting direction in which to increase our knowledge of allocation mechanisms and their performance characteristics. Not only does the project promise to contribute to the body of economic theory in a substantial way, it will affect the ways firms and public bodies allocate certain scarce productive resources (such as computer networks).