No Manipulable and Fair Allocation of Private Goods

私人物品不可操纵和公平分配

• 批准号: 9109005
• 负责人: Herve Moulin
• 金额: $ 6.46万
• 依托单位: Duke University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 1991
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 1991-07-15 至 1993-12-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=9109005&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: No; Manipulable; Fair; Allocation; Private

This research concerns allocation in simple private goods situations such as assignment of transmission capacity in a computer network. A strong case can be made that in such problems (i) non manipulability (i.e., dominant strategies) is a very desirable property, (ii) replacing the requirement of Pareto efficiency with a fairness criterion is sensible - particularly since efficiency and non manipulability are inconsistent requirements, and (iii) local serial dictatorship is acceptable provided anonymity holds globally. It has been shown that the serial social choice function satisfies these criteria. This research is to characterize the class of mechanisms that satisfy these criteria. This project is the point of departure for a systematic analysis of strategy-proof mechanisms for allocating private goods. It represents an important and exciting direction in which to increase our knowledge of allocation mechanisms and their performance characteristics. Not only does the project promise to contribute to the body of economic theory in a substantial way, it will affect the ways firms and public bodies allocate certain scarce productive resources (such as computer networks).

本研究关注简单私人物品的分配 例如，在一个 计算机网络 一个强有力的理由是，在这样的问题， (i)不可操作性（即，优势策略）是一个非常 （二）替代帕累托要求 以公平为标准的效率是合理的，特别是 由于效率和不可操纵性是不一致 要求，以及（iii）本地串行独裁是可以接受的 只要全球都保持匿名 已显示 序列社会选择函数满足这些标准。 这 研究的目的是描述满足以下条件的机制类别： 这些标准。 该项目是系统分析的起点 分配私人物品的防策略机制。它 代表了一个重要而令人兴奋的方向， 我们对分配机制及其性能的了解 特色 该项目不仅承诺将为 经济理论的主体，它将影响 公司和公共机构分配某些稀缺生产力的方式， 资源（如计算机网络）。