A Structural Model of Collective Bargaining and Turnover

有关公立学校教师的劳动问题是劳动经济学中最有趣和最重要的应用研究领域之一。在教师供应萎缩的时代，教育系统也面临着令人震惊的教师流动率。本研究的目的是分析教师薪酬和流动性。建立了重叠型教师群体聘用和留用的理论模型。通过研究合同确定的谈判模型，工会中间选民的偏好起着至关重要的作用，有可能明确地关注工会在谈判过程中的作用。该模型将使用宾夕法尼亚州公立学校教师的不同寻常的数据集进行测试。这些数据包括按学区划分的10万名教师的信息，以及按学区划分的集体谈判合同信息。通过将整个1980年代的S纳入该州的所有501个区，创建了一组大量而详细的面板数据，这为实证检验流动性和集体谈判之间的联系提供了一个非同寻常的机会。这项研究很重要，因为它将为旨在吸引和留住公立学校更好教师的教育改革措施的有效性提供新的线索。

Labor issues concerning public school teachers represent one of the most interesting and important areas of applied research in labor economics. In an era of shrinking supply of teachers, the educational system is also confronted with an alarming rate of teacher turnover. The purpose of this research is to analyze teacher compensation and mobility. A theoretical model is developed of the hiring and retention of overlapping cohorts of teacher. By studying a bargaining model of contract determination in which the preferences of the union's median voter plays a crucial role, it is possible to focus explicitly on the role of unions in the bargaining process. The model will be tested using an unusual data set of public school teachers in Pennsylvania. The data includes information on 100,000 teachers by school district, along with information on collective bargaining contracts by school district. By including all 501 districts in the state throughout the 1980's, a large and detailed set of panel data has been created which provides an extraordinary opportunity to examine empirically the link between mobility and collective bargaining. This research is important because it will shed new light on the effectiveness of education reform measures aimed at attracting and retaining better teachers in the public schools.