Collaborative Research on International and Domestic Determinants of Legal and Institutional Change in Japan

日本法律和制度变迁的国际和国内决定因素的合作研究

• 批准号: 9113738
• 负责人: Frances Rosenbluth
• 金额: $ 2.38万
• 依托单位: University of California-San Diego
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 1991
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 1991-10-15 至 1992-08-15
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=9113738&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Collaborative; Research; International; Domestic; Determinants

This project focuses on the way that the legal and institutional structure of government in Japan shapes policymaking and enforcement. The analytic approach is guided by a rational-choice principal-agent perspective. Undertaking both theoretical and empirical work, the research challenges "culturalist" theories holding that Japanese bureaucracy, and more specifically Japanese bureaucratic culture, has a singular and salient effect on Japanese policy-making. A working hypothesis in the study is that "culture" is a less effective explanatory variable than particular rational concerns explored under the rubric of "principal-agent" theory. Based on time-series analyses over four decades, the study examines the impact that changes in international trade and domestic elections have had on budget patterns, regulatory policies, court decisions, and bureaucratic and judicial career paths. By clarifying the institutional structure of politics and testing the impact that this structure has on Japanese domestic and international policies, the study will identify the determinants of Japanese policymaking and enforcement and how those change under foreign pressure. It will also move principal-agent theory beyond its U.S.-based roots to a more global model. As such, it will uncover new ways of understanding the role of party leaders, new forms of principal-agent monitoring, and new implications that such monitoring poses for judicial independence.

该项目重点研究日本政府的法律和制度结构影响政策制定和执行的方式。 分析方法以理性选择委托代理视角为指导。 该研究通过理论和实证工作，挑战了“文化主义”理论，即日本官僚机构，更具体地说是日本官僚文化，对日本的政策制定具有独特而显着的影响。 该研究中的一个有效假设是，“文化”是一个不如“委托代理”理论下探讨的特定理性关注有效的解释变量。 该研究基于四十年来的时间序列分析，探讨了国际贸易和国内选举的变化对预算模式、监管政策、法院判决以及官僚和司法职业道路的影响。 通过阐明政治的制度结构并检验该结构对日本国内和国际政策的影响，该研究将确定日本政策制定和执行的决定因素以及这些因素在外国压力下如何变化。 它还将使委托代理理论超越其美国根源，转向更加全球化的模式。 因此，它将揭示理解政党领导人角色的新方法、委托代理监督的新形式，以及这种监督对司法独立带来的新影响。