Collaborative Research on International and Domestic Determinants of Legal and Institutional Change in Japan

这个项目的重点是如何使法律的和体制的 日本的政府结构决定了政策的制定， 执法 分析方法是由理性选择指导的 委托代理视角 理论和实践相结合， 实证工作，研究挑战“文化主义”理论 日本的官僚机构，更具体地说， 官僚文化对日本人的影响是独特而突出的 决策。 这项研究的一个假设是， 是一个比特定理性更有效的解释变量 在“委托代理”理论的标题下探讨的问题。 根据四十年来的时间序列分析，该研究考察了 国际贸易和国内市场变化的影响 选举对预算模式、监管政策、法院 决策，以及官僚和司法职业道路。 通过明确政治的制度结构和测试 这种结构对日本国内和 国际政策，研究将确定决定因素 日本的政策制定和执行，以及这些政策在 外国压力。 这也将使委托代理理论超越 美国-基于根到一个更全球化的模型。 因此， 揭示理解党的领导人的作用的新方法，新的 委托代理监督的形式，以及这种监督的新含义， 监督对司法独立构成威胁。

This project focuses on the way that the legal and institutional structure of government in Japan shapes policymaking and enforcement. The analytic approach is guided by a rational-choice principal-agent perspective. Undertaking both theoretical and empirical work, the research challenges "culturalist" theories holding that Japanese bureaucracy, and more specifically Japanese bureaucratic culture, has a singular and salient effect on Japanese policy-making. A working hypothesis in the study is that "culture" is a less effective explanatory variable than particular rational concerns explored under the rubric of "principal-agent" theory. Based on time-series analyses over four decades, the study examines the impact that changes in international trade and domestic elections have had on budget patterns, regulatory policies, court decisions, and bureaucratic and judicial career paths. By clarifying the institutional structure of politics and testing the impact that this structure has on Japanese domestic and international policies, the study will identify the determinants of Japanese policymaking and enforcement and how those change under foreign pressure. It will also move principal-agent theory beyond its U.S.-based roots to a more global model. As such, it will uncover new ways of understanding the role of party leaders, new forms of principal-agent monitoring, and new implications that such monitoring poses for judicial independence.