Managerial Opportunism, Solutions, and Strategies: Evidencefrom Early Chartered Companies

与此同时，欧洲海外贸易的增长 16和17世纪是使用特许的 公司作为进行贸易的首选方式。 这些特许公司，出于所有意图和目的， 跨国公司。 总部设在欧洲， 经理，工厂和贸易场所位于周围， 在非洲、亚洲、加拿大。 因为这些公司 他们的分支工厂与受薪经理，总部是 立即面临的问题是，如何确保这些 经理们为公司而不是为自己工作。 这是 这是所有现代跨国公司都面临的问题， 多地公司 事实上，这是非常直接的 这个问题使得对这些历史悠久的公司的研究 重要. 这些公司在一个不太复杂的 环境 通信速度较慢， 在总部一级不存在所有权和控制权。 因此，所有者和所选策略之间的联系非常重要。 明确，并有可能分析哪些战略选择， 控制经理是可行的解决方案，并研究什么 环境允许企业选择这些解决方案。 这 信息将帮助我们更好地理解为什么一些美国人 公司结构是成功的，而其他人则不是在不同的 情况和时间段。 因为特许公司是垂直整合的公司， 它们面临着潜在的严重的委托人/代理人问题。 在 事实上，二手文献几乎是一致的， 公司的特工是公司最大的敌人 尽管有这些声明，但几乎没有做过档案工作， 研究管理机会主义的程度。 这些公司 可能是旧的，但这并不一定意味着他们是 在管理实践中不老练。 的目的 研究是研究一系列早期的特许公司， 研究企业选择的战略和解决方案， 不同的外部市场，但都有相同的内部 结构 关于这些问题的理论文献以及 博弈论将该项目的重点引向就业 合同、担保关系和监测战略;所有这些 这有助于改善道德风险和逆向选择 在管理者中。

Coincidentally with the growth of European overseas trade in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was the use of the chartered company as the preferred means by which trade was carried out. These chartered companies were, for all intent and purposes, multinational firms. The head office was located in Europe and managers, factories, and trading sites were located around the world - in Africa, Asia, Canada. Because these firms operated their branch plants with salaried managers, the head offices were immediately faced with the question of how to ensure that those managers worked for the company and not for themselves. This is a problems which faces all modern multinational and multilocational firms. In fact, it is the very immediacy of the issue that makes the study of these far older companies important. These companies operated in a less complex environment. Communications were slower and a separation between ownership and control at the head office level did not exist. Thus, the links between owners and strategies chosen are very clear, and it is possible to analyze which strategies chosen to control managers were viable solutions and to examine what circumstances allowed firms to choose those solutions. This information will help us to better understand why some American firm structures are successful while others not in different situations and time periods. Because chartered companies were vertically integrated firms, they faced potentially serious principal/agent problems. In fact, the secondary literature is almost unanimous in its verdict that a company's agents were the company's worst enemies. Despite such statements, little archival work has been done to examine the extent of managerial opportunism. These companies may be old, but this does not necessarily mean that they were unsophisticated in managerial practices. The objective of this research is to study a range of early chartered companies and to examine the strategies and solutions chosen by firms operating in different external markets, but all with the same internal structure. The theoretical literature on such problems and on game theory directs the focus of this project towards employment contracts, bonding relations and monitoring strategies; all of which help to ameliorate moral hazard and adverse selection amongst managers.