Generalizations of Condorcet's Jury Theorem
Generalizations of Condorcet's Jury Theorem
批准号:
9210800
负责人:
Krishna Ladha
金额:
$2.5万
依托单位:
依托单位国家:
美国
项目类别:
Standard Grant
财政年份:
1992
资助国家:
美国
项目状态:
已结题
起止时间:
1992-07-15 至 1993-12-31
中文摘要
社会和组织在搜索上花费了大量的资源 或者说,我们要认清世界的真实状态。 为 例如,必须决定被告是否有罪, 经济衰退或某块土地上有石油。 通常,决策是在相对无知的状态下做出的 因为没人知道真相 问题随之而来:靠什么 社会应该如何决定? 尤其是社会上 很可能通过将发现的任务委托给它的一个 委员会或陪审团(委员会)遵循多数规则 投票? 如果是后者,陪审团应该是谁? 当方案个数为2时,孔多塞陪审团定理 (CJT)在某些情况下,大多数陪审员 会比任何一个人做得更好。 可惜这些 条件难以满足:CJT假设陪审员(i) 有共同的目标;(2)独立投票。 在现实中, 假设(i)可能不满足,假设(ii)很少满足。 这项研究调查旨在推进孔多塞的陪审团 不同方向的定理。 它综合了前面的工作 同时允许利益冲突, 相关投票 它研究选择情况,其中 替代方案不是固定的,而是从相互作用中产生的。 选民 特别是,该研究旨在具体说明条件 在这种情况下,相对不知情的选民获得了结果, 它将在充分了解情况下作出选择。
英文摘要
Societies and organizations spend considerable resources in search of the truth or to identify the true state of the world. For example, it must be decided whether a defendant is guilty, an economy is in recession or a given parcel of land bears oil. Usually, the decision is made in a state of relative ignorance because no one knows the truth. The question then arises: By what rule should the society decide? In particular, is the society more likely to succeed by delegating the task of discovery to one of its members or to a jury (committee) which follows majority-rule voting? If the latter, who should be on the jury? When the number of alternatives is two, Condorcet's jury theorem (CJT) states that under certain conditions a majority of jurors would do better than any one individual. Unfortunately, these conditions are difficult to satisfy: CJT assumes that jurors (i) share a common goal, and (ii) vote independently. In reality, assumption (i) may not be met, and assumption (ii) is seldom met. This research investigation seeks to advance Condorcet's jury theorem in various directions. It synthesizes the preceding work on CJT by permitting simultaneously both conflict of interest and correlated votes. It studies choice situations where the alternatives are not fixed but arise from interactions among the voters. In particular, the research seeks to specify conditions under which a relatively uninformed electorate attains the outcome it would choose with full information.
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