Information Aggregation and the Condorcet Jury Theorem

奥斯汀-史密斯 SBR 9510877 尽管大量的研究致力于集体决策的研究，相对较少的是已知的不确定性条件下的决策。 在一个决策者有相同的基本偏好，但在信息稀缺和不平等共享的情况下运作的世界里，由于信息不对称，群体成员可能会对可用的替代方案产生分歧。 在这种情况下，孔多塞陪审团定理得出结论：当不确定哪一个选择实际上是最好的时候，大多数人比任何一个人更有可能选择“正确”的选择。 该提案寻求资金，以调查孔多塞陪审团定理的性质。 它将发展一种基于判断的民主模式下的集体决策理论。 博弈论分析将有助于告知陪审团定理的影响可以评估的战略考虑。 将强调信息汇总在不确定条件下发挥的关键作用。

Austin-Smith SBR 9510877 Despite extensive research devoted to the study of collective decision making, relatively little is known about the decision making under conditions of uncertainty. In a world in which decision makers have the same fundamental preferences but operate in a situation where information is scarce and unequally shared, group members may disagree with respect to the available alternatives as a result of informational asymetries. Under such conditions, the Condorcet Jury Theorem concludes: majorities are more likely to select the "correct" alternative than any single individual when there is uncertainty about which alternative is in fact the best. This proposal seeks funding to investigate the properties of the Condorcet Jury Theorem. It will develop a theory of collective decision making under a judgment-based model of democracy. Game theoretic analyses will help inform the strategic considerations under which the impact of the jury theorem can be assessed. The crucial role played by information aggregation in conditions of uncertainty will be highlighted.