The Dynamics of Representation: The Public, Politics, and Budgetary Policy

本研究的重点是民意与政策之间的相互关系。公众舆论是否会影响政策，我们知道的很多，但公众本身是否会对政策行为做出反应，是否会根据政策制定者的实际行为调整其对政策活动的偏好，我们却知之甚少。一个积极响应的公众实际上就像一个恒温器，一旦偏离了所青睐的政策温度，就会产生相应调整政策的信号，一旦调整充分，信号就会停止。本研究调查考虑了公众行为是否具有恒温性，并主要依赖于预算政策的统计分析和公众在一段时间内的支出偏好，跨越一系列预算意见领域。这项研究既探讨了公众偏好对预算政策增加支出的影响，也探讨了这些决定反过来对公众偏好的影响。初步分析表明，公众对决策过程的投入与决策过程产生的产出之间存在很强的相互联系。从最简单的意义上说，当公众想要更多的支出时，他们就会得到更多，而当他们得到更多时，他们就不想要那么多了。这项研究对公共政策/公众舆论的相互关系产生了重要的见解。

This research investigation focuses on the interrelationship between public opinion and policy over time. While a lot is known about whether public opinion influences policy, little is known about whether the public is itself responsive to policy behavior, adjusting its preferences for policy activity in response to what policymakers acutally do. A responsive public would effectively behave like a thermostat, where a deaprture from the favored policy temperature produces a signal to adjust policy accordingly and, once sufficiently adjusted, the signal stops. This research investigation considers whether the public behaves thermostatically, and relies primarily on statistical analyses of budgetary policy and public preferences for spending over time, across a range of budget opinion domains. The research addresses both the influence of public preferences for more spending on budgetary policy and the influence of those decisions, in turn, on public preferences. Preliminary analysis suggests that there are strong reciprocal connections between public inputs into the policymaking process and the outputs the process generates. In its simplest sense, when the public wants more spending it gets more, and when it gets more it doesn't want as much more. This research produces important insights in the public policy/public opinion interrelationship.