Social Organization and Social Evolution

小行星9310276 传统的战略互动模型假设，一群高度理性的参与者以非合作的方式相互互动，以确定集体的结果。 虽然这些模型提高了我们对集中式社会化互动的理解，比如在组织良好的金融资产市场中看到的，但它们没有解决劳动力市场、零售服务市场和许多非市场社会环境中出现的分散式非合作竞争。 这种现象最好被建模为具有空间结构的游戏。 玩家在指定的地点生活。 每个玩家只与他的近邻竞争（或者更一般地说，互动）。 尽管如此，远距离参与者的选择通过一系列共享邻居的参与者有间接的影响。 通过这种分散的空间或地理结构进行的社会互动与中心化的社会互动形成鲜明对比，在中心化的社会互动中，每个人都直接与其他人互动。 本研究将探讨如何随着时间的推移，互动是分散的战略选择演变。 初步研究表明，传统博弈论的尖锐理性假设对于理解竞争如何演变以及最终实现什么结果是不必要的。 因此，调查将研究放弃传统的超理性模型而倾向于对个人行为进行更宽松的限制的后果，并研究玩家群体的空间结构如何增强或抑制游戏的组织（例如，在所谓的“协调博弈”中合作的演变）。 该项目的另一个主题是通过集中式社会互动和分散式互动实现的社会成果之间的对比。 最后，该项目将研究不同的“互动技术”的后果，如随机匹配和固定的合作伙伴，为集体选择的演变。 ***

9310276 Blume Traditional models of strategic interaction assume that a population of highly rational players interacts with one another in a non-cooperative fashion to determine a collective outcome. While these models improve our understanding of centralized socialized interaction such as that seen in well-organized financial asset markets, they do not address the kind of decentralized non- cooperative competition that arises in labor markets, markets for retail services, and many non-market social settings. Such phenomena are best modeled as games with a spatial structure. Players live at given locations. Each player competes (or, more generally, interacts) only with his near neighbors. Nonetheless the choice of distant players has an indirect effect through a string of players who share neighbors who share neighbors, etc. Social interaction through this decentralized spatial or geographic structure stands in contrast to centralized social interaction wherein everyone interacts directly with everyone else. This research will investigate how strategic choice evolves over time when interaction is decentralized. Preliminary research has shown that the sharp rationality hypotheses of traditional game theory are not necessary to understand how competition evolves and what outcomes are ultimately achieved. Consequently the investigation will study the consequences of abandoning the traditional models of hyper-rationality in favor of looser strictures on individual behavior, and study how the spatial structure of the player population enhances or inhibits the organization of play (e.g., the evolution of cooperation in so- called "coordination games"). Another theme of the project is the contrast between social outcomes that can be reached through centralized social interaction and those that are achieved with decentralized interaction. Finally, the project will study the ramifications of different "interaction technologies," such as random matching and fixed partners, for the evolution of collective choice. ***