Collaborative Research: The Design and Rating of Securities

合作研究：证券的设计和评级

• 批准号: 9409567
• 负责人: Darrell Duffie
• 金额: $ 14.53万
• 依托单位: Stanford University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Continuing Grant
• 财政年份: 1994
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 1994-10-15 至 1996-09-30
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=9409567&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Collaborative; Research; Design; Rating; Securities

The purpose of this project is develop economic models for analyzing the design of securities, considering the roles of market liquidity, security ratings, credit enhancement, and the distribution of information across investor groups. Among the questions to be addressed are: What is the role of security rating agencies in mitigating the costs of illiquidity, and how is security design affected by that role? Is there a useful role for rating agencies beyond the traditional role of evaluating default risk? Do informational asymmetries and other distinctions among investor groups cause clientele effects in security design? The results of this project are intended to further our understanding of how security market innovation and rating are affected by information held asymmetrically among issuers, underwriters, broker-dealers, and groups of investors. The project may also include results that in will assist security issuers, underwriters and rating agencies in the efficient conduct of their businesses. In addition, the research may also uncover welfare implications that will be useful to decision- makers in formulating regulations regarding the use of security ratings.

该项目的目的是开发分析证券设计的经济模型，考虑市场流动性、证券评级、信用增强和投资者群体之间信息分布的作用。需要解决的问题包括：证券评级机构在减轻非流动性成本方面的作用是什么，以及该角色如何影响证券设计？除了评估违约风险的传统角色之外，评级机构还有什么有用的角色吗？投资者群体之间的信息不对称和其他差异是否会导致证券设计中的客户效应？该项目的结果旨在进一步加深我们对证券市场创新和评级如何受到发行人、承销商、经纪自营商和投资者群体之间不对称持有的信息的影响的理解。该项目还可能包括有助于证券发行人、承销商和评级机构有效开展业务的结果。此外，该研究还可能揭示福利的含义，这将有助于决策者制定有关使用安全评级的法规。