课题基金 / 基金详情

Bilateral Contracting in Network Financial Markets

Bilateral Contracting in Network Financial Markets
网络金融市场中的双边合约
批准号:
1460019
负责人:
Darrell Duffie
金额:
$8.35万
依托单位:
依托单位国家:
美国
项目类别:
Standard Grant
财政年份:
2015
资助国家:
美国
项目状态:
已结题
起止时间:
2015-06-01 至 2016-11-30

项目摘要

项目成果

Darrell Duffie的其他基金

相似基金

相关文献

中文摘要
翻译
我们利用和推广了现有的双边谈判的公理和非合作理论,回到了约翰·纳什和阿里尔·鲁宾斯坦的非网络理论。这个项目的广泛影响是,有可能提高通过双边谈判运作的以网络为基础的市场的分配效率,并查明双边合同谈判效率低下的情况。我们将颤手型均衡细化概念推广到交替出价博弈中,并推广了基于网络的双边议价问题解的公理。该项目将扩展网络市场的双边合同理论,如公司债务的场外交易市场和包括掉期在内的双边衍生品。目标是更好地区分条件,包括讨价还价协议,在这些条件下,双边合同是社会有效的,受市场关系的网络结构和网络兼容的可收缩行动的菜单的限制。一个例子是确定公司和金融机构之间的合同将破产公司的资产转让给其债权人并以有效方式交换对手方的情况。否则,破产法应该被用来推翻双边协商的合同待遇。破产中止可以胜过终止、担保、清仓净额和破产优先权转让的权利。法规可以赋予法院或破产管理人在破产时中止合同的权利,并收回在破产之前发生的低效转让。
英文摘要
We exploit and generalize existing axiomatic and non-­cooperative theories of bilateral bargaining, going back to non-­network based theories of John Nash and Ariel Rubinstein. The broad impact of this project is the potential improvement of allocative efficeincy in arange of network-based markets that operate through bilateral negotaition, and the identfication of settings in which bilateral bargaining over contracts is inefficeint. We extend trembling-hand type equilibrium refinemnet concepts to alternating offer games, and extend axioms for solutions of network-based bilateral bargaining problems.This project will extend the theory of bilateral contracting in network markets, such as over-the-counter markets for corporate debt and bilateral derivatives including swaps. The goal is to better distinguish conditions, including bargaining protocols, under which bilateral contracting is socially efficient, constrained by the network structure of market relationships and the menus of network-compatible contractible actions. An example is the identification of situations in which contracting between corporations and financial institutions will assign a bankrupt firm's assets to its creditors and swap counterparties in an efficient manner. If not the bankruptcy code should be used to override bilaterally negotiated contractual treatments. Bankruptcy stays can trump rights of termination, collateral, closeout netting, and assignment of insolvency priority. Statutes can give courts or insolvency administrators the right to stay contracts at insolvency and claw back inefficient transfers that occurred prior to insolvency.
期刊论文(0)
专著(0)
科研奖励(0)
会议论文
Collaborative Research: The Design and Rating of Securities
  • 批准号:
    9409567
  • 项目类别:
    Continuing Grant
  • 资助金额:
    $14.53万
  • 财政年份:
    1994
  • 负责人:
    Darrell Duffie
  • 依托单位:
Two Problems in Financial Economics
  • 批准号:
    9010062
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant
  • 资助金额:
    $7.55万
  • 财政年份:
    1990
  • 负责人:
    Darrell Duffie
  • 依托单位:
海外基金