Bilateral Contracting in Network Financial Markets

网络金融市场中的双边合约

• 批准号: 1460019
• 负责人: Darrell Duffie
• 金额: $ 8.35万
• 依托单位: Stanford University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2015
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2015-06-01 至 2016-11-30
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1460019&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Bilateral; Contracting; Network; Financial; Markets

We exploit and generalize existing axiomatic and non-­cooperative theories of bilateral bargaining, going back to non-­network based theories of John Nash and Ariel Rubinstein. The broad impact of this project is the potential improvement of allocative efficeincy in arange of network-based markets that operate through bilateral negotaition, and the identfication of settings in which bilateral bargaining over contracts is inefficeint. We extend trembling-hand type equilibrium refinemnet concepts to alternating offer games, and extend axioms for solutions of network-based bilateral bargaining problems.This project will extend the theory of bilateral contracting in network markets, such as over-the-counter markets for corporate debt and bilateral derivatives including swaps. The goal is to better distinguish conditions, including bargaining protocols, under which bilateral contracting is socially efficient, constrained by the network structure of market relationships and the menus of network-compatible contractible actions. An example is the identification of situations in which contracting between corporations and financial institutions will assign a bankrupt firm's assets to its creditors and swap counterparties in an efficient manner. If not the bankruptcy code should be used to override bilaterally negotiated contractual treatments. Bankruptcy stays can trump rights of termination, collateral, closeout netting, and assignment of insolvency priority. Statutes can give courts or insolvency administrators the right to stay contracts at insolvency and claw back inefficient transfers that occurred prior to insolvency.

我们利用和推广了现有的双边谈判的公理和非合作理论，回到了约翰·纳什和阿里尔·鲁宾斯坦的基于非网络的理论。该项目的广泛影响是潜在地提高了通过双边谈判运作的各种基于网络的市场的配置效率，并查明了双边合同谈判无效的环境。我们将颤手型均衡精化概念推广到交替报价博弈，并扩展了基于网络的双边谈判问题的解的公理。本项目将扩展网络市场中的双边契约理论，例如公司债券的场外市场和包括掉期在内的双边衍生品市场。目标是更好地区分条件，包括谈判协议，在这些条件下，双边订约在社会上是有效的，受到市场关系的网络结构和与网络兼容的收缩行动菜单的制约。一个例子是确定公司和金融机构之间的合同将破产公司的资产有效地转让给其债权人和互换交易对手的情况。否则，破产法应被用来凌驾于双方协商的合同待遇之上。破产暂缓可以胜过终止、抵押品、结清净额和分配破产优先权的权利。法规可赋予法院或破产管理人在破产时中止合同和追回破产前发生的低效转让的权利。