Collaborative Research on Binding Agreements

约束性协议的合作研究

• 批准号: 9414142
• 负责人: Rajiv Vohra
• 金额: $ 11.2万
• 依托单位: Brown University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Continuing Grant
• 财政年份: 1994
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 1994-10-15 至 1997-09-30
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=9414142&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Collaborative; Research; Binding; Agreements

9414142 Vohra This project studies the nature of binding agreements in strategic situations. A model is considered in which binding agreements can, in principle, be written among any group of agents. The project rigorously analyzes the agreements that occur in an equilibrium of free and unrestricted negotiation. At the most fundamental level, the investigators address the issue of how to conceptualize the series of negotiations that ultimately lead to the signing of an agreement. This will make an important contribution to bargaining theory because the literature on bargaining over actions of games is nonexistent. The principal focus of the research is on the question of efficiency in binding agreements. This project challenges the consensus among economists that if binding agreements can be written in the absence of informational asymmetries, then the gains from cooperation will be fully exploited. The investigators will generalize examples from their previous work of binding agreements in the presence of external effects that do not correspond to an efficient or cooperative outcome. These results arise only when there are three or more agents. The emergence of inefficiency is closely related to the assignment of property rights. This line of basic research is relevant to the Human Dimensions of Global Change because it will provide new insights and better tools for analyzing negotiations needed to reach binding environmental agreements. For example, the famous Coase Theorem was used to show that competitive markets will produce efficient agreements in the presence of pollution. The investigators' research shows that there is a breakdown of efficiency when the right to pollute is the assigned status quo.

小行星9414142 本项目研究战略局势中具有约束力的协定的性质。 一个模型被认为是具有约束力的协议，原则上，可以写在任何一组代理。 该项目严格分析了在自由和不受限制的谈判平衡中发生的协议。 在最基本的层面上，调查人员处理的问题是如何将最终导致签署协议的一系列谈判概念化。 这将对讨价还价理论做出重要贡献，因为关于博弈行为讨价还价的文献是不存在的。 研究的主要重点是具有约束力的协定的效率问题。 该项目挑战了经济学家的共识，即如果可以在没有信息不对称的情况下编写具有约束力的协议，那么合作的收益将得到充分利用。 研究人员将从他们以前的工作中归纳出一些例子，这些例子涉及在外部效应不对应于有效或合作结果的情况下具有约束力的协议。 只有当有三个或更多的代理人时，这些结果才会出现。 低效率的产生与产权的分配密切相关。 这一系列基础研究与全球变化的人的方面有关，因为它将为分析达成具有约束力的环境协定所需的谈判提供新的见解和更好的工具。 例如，著名的科斯定理被用来表明，在存在污染的情况下，竞争性市场将产生有效的协议。 调查人员的研究表明，当污染权被指定为现状时，效率就会崩溃。