Cooperation and Incentives in Models with Asymmetric Information

信息不对称模型中的合作与激励

• 批准号: 0133113
• 负责人: Rajiv Vohra
• 金额: $ 29.27万
• 依托单位: Brown University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Continuing Grant
• 财政年份: 2002
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2002-03-15 至 2005-02-28
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0133113&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Cooperation; Incentives; Models; Asymmetric; Information

The analysis of incomplete information has had a profound impact on economic theory, especially in the context of non-cooperative models. However, cooperative theory in the presence of asymmetric information is much less settled. This project will study important open problems of cooperation and incentives under asymmetric information, with an eye on applications such as auctions and bargaining. Due to the importance of individual incentives, the research will rely heavily on insights from non-cooperative game theory and mechanism design.When economic agents can cooperate with each other, it is important to consider economic allocations that are immune to changes induced by self-interested groups or coalitions. The idea of coalitional stability is typically formalized through the set of allocations known as the `core,' also connected with the theory of competitive markets. This project is concerned with the theory of the core in an environment with asymmetric information. When a coalition of asymmetrically informed agents forms, it is not clear how much information will be shared among them because it may be in their individual interest to hide some of it. The research will analyze how to formalize coalitional stability in this context. It will provide a way of making endogenous the amount of information pooling among agents, and investigate conditions under which the set of "core" allocations is non-empty. The research will also explore how non-cooperative decentralized mechanisms may be designed to implement socially desirable outcomes. The results of the project will lead to a better understanding of important social, political and economic phenomena, including collusion in auctions and coalition formation in problems of bargaining.

对不完全信息的分析对经济理论产生了深远的影响，特别是在非合作模型的背景下。 然而，在信息不对称的情况下，合作理论还没有得到很好的解决。该项目将研究在不对称信息下合作和激励的重要开放问题，着眼于拍卖和讨价还价等应用。由于个体激励的重要性，研究将在很大程度上依赖于非合作博弈论和机制设计的见解。当经济主体可以相互合作时，重要的是要考虑经济分配不受自利团体或联盟引起的变化的影响。联盟稳定性的概念通常通过被称为“核心”的一组分配形式化，也与竞争市场理论有关。本课题主要研究信息不对称环境下的核心理论。当一个联盟的不对称知情的代理人的形式，这是不清楚有多少信息将在他们之间共享，因为它可能是在他们的个人利益，以隐藏一些it.The研究将分析如何形式化联盟的稳定性在这种情况下。它将提供一种方法，使内源性的代理之间的信息池的数量，并调查条件下的“核心”分配的集合是非空的。这项研究还将探讨如何设计非合作的权力下放机制，以实现社会期望的结果。该项目的结果将导致更好地了解重要的社会、政治和经济现象，包括拍卖中的串通和讨价还价问题中的联盟形成。