Reputation and Perspective in Bargaining

项目摘要：双方（工会和企业，买方和卖方，或两个政府，例如）之间的讨价还价是最常见的经济事件之一，但经济学家远没有明确了解它是如何运作的。这个项目涉及到研究议价方式的两项创新。第一种是讨价还价的模型，它比过去分析的模型更灵活：它允许讨价还价者进行微妙的“声誉建设”行为，试图说服她的对手，她不太可能在不久的将来做出让步。从技术上讲，引入的“内生扰动”导致了具有似是而非味道的实质性预测：讨价还价通常涉及长时间的不活动，随后是明显的规模让步，通常受到一定程度的相互妥协的欢迎。第二个创新认识到达成协议的一个困难是，谈判者对自然或公平协议的看法可能真的不同。虽然第一方明白这一点，但她无法知道第二方的实际观点是什么。不幸的是，这给了对方一种动机，让他们（通过言语和行动）给人一种相对严肃或自私的印象。谈判各方在达成协议过程中所遭受的损失有时会导致他们在协议不再非常合适（外部环境发生了变化）的情况下仍然坚持协议，因为他们担心会造成事端。这可以构成动力模型中惯性理论的基础。“粘性价格”对于宏观经济学的核心问题至关重要；寡头垄断市场的价格惯性是“议价视角”模型的主要应用。

Project Abstract Bargaining between two parties (a union and a firm, a buyer and a seller, or two governments, for example) is one of the most common economic occurrences, but economists are far from having a definitive understanding of how it works. This project involves two innovations in the way bargaining can be studied. The first is a model of bargaining that is more flexible than those analyzed in the past: it allows for a bargainer to engage in subtle `reputation-building` behavior, trying to convince her opponent that she is unlikely to make a concession in the near future. Technically, the `endogenous perturbations` that are introduced result in substantial predictions that have a plausible flavor: Bargaining typically involves long periods of inactivity, followed by concessions of noticeable size that are often greeted by a degree of reciprocal compromise. The second innovation recognizes that one difficulty in reaching agreement is that bargainers may genuinely differ in their perspectives on what a natural or fair agreement would be. While the first party understands this, she has no way of knowing what the second party's actual perspective is. This unfortunately gives the second party an incentive to convey the impression (through words and actions) of having a relatively severe, or self-serving, perspective. The losses sustained by the bargainers in reaching an agreement sometimes lead them to cling to an agreement even when it is no longer very suitable (external circumstances having changed), for fear of the consequences of rocking the boat. This could form the basis of a theory of inertia in dynamic models. `Sticky prices` are of major importance for the central questions of macroeconomics; price inertia in oligopolistic markets is a leading application of the `perspective in bargaining` model to be studied.