Collaborative Research: The Economics of Expertise

合作研究：专业知识经济学

• 批准号: 9618726
• 负责人: Vijay Krishna
• 金额: $ 12.63万
• 依托单位: Pennsylvania State Univ University Park
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 1997
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 1997-03-01 至 2000-02-29
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=9618726&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Collaborative; Research; Economics; Expertise

The diverse range of problems faced by decision makers almost precludes the possibility of their possessing the expertise needed to make informed judgements in all areas. As a result, the power to make decisions is often divorced from the relevant specialized knowledge. It is the `division of labor` between decision makers and experts that is the focus of this research. Specifically, its goal is to analyze the strategic interplay between a single decision maker and a number of experts from whom he might choose to seek advice. Employing tools from the economics of information and game theory, the project will undertake a theoretical analysis of a model broad enough to be consistent with a variety of institutional settings. Of particular concern are situations in which the decision maker is able to consult multiple experts and, thus, is the recipient of multiple, sometimes conflicting, pieces of advice. Moreover, this advice is not given by completely disinterested parties: the experts may have interests which, even if not at odds with, are not coincident with those of the decision maker. The latter's task is then to aggregate the information received in such an environment effectively. Three broad sets of issues will be addressed. The first concerns the tradeoff between expertise and loyalty, the latter determining how closely an expert's interests are aligned with those of the decision maker. Some questions addressed are: How should a decision maker integrate the opinions of experts who are equally proficient but have differing loyalties? Is it possible to get the experts to disclose more information by playing one off against the other? Should the advice of `inferior` experts necessarily be ignored? How many experts should be consulted? The second relates to the twin issues of compensation and delegation. How should experts be compensated for their advice? Can optimal compensation schemes lead to full disclosure? When should a decision maker delegate the authority to make decisions to an expert? The third part of the project will explore some wider implications of the research summarized above to the general question of information elicitation from imperfectly informed agents. The fact that the decision maker cannot credibly commit to a course of action, a mechanism, distinguishes this problem from that traditionally considered in mechanism design theory. In particular, contrary to the lessons of the traditional theory, achieving full-disclosure and first-best outcomes is difficult.

决策者所面临的各种各样的问题几乎排除了他们拥有在所有领域作出知情判断所需的专门知识的可能性。 因此，决策权往往与相关的专业知识脱节。 决策者和专家之间的"分工"是本研究的重点。 具体来说，它的目标是分析一个决策者和一些专家之间的战略相互作用，他可能会选择向他们寻求建议。 该项目将利用信息经济学和博弈论的工具，对一个足够广泛的模型进行理论分析，以便与各种体制环境保持一致。 特别令人关切的是，决策者能够咨询多位专家，因此得到多个、有时相互矛盾的建议。此外，这种意见并非由完全无利害关系的各方提出：专家可能有与决策者的利益即使不相抵触，也不一致的利益。 后者的任务是有效地汇总在这种环境中收到的信息。 将讨论三大类问题。 第一个问题涉及专业知识和忠诚度之间的权衡，后者决定了专家的利益与决策者的利益有多密切。 解决的一些问题是：决策者应该如何整合专家的意见谁是同样精通，但有不同的忠诚？ 有没有可能通过挑拨离间的方式让专家们透露更多的信息？ “劣等”专家的建议就一定要被忽视吗？ 需要咨询多少专家？ 第二个问题涉及报酬和授权这两个问题。 专家的建议应如何得到补偿？ 最佳补偿方案能否导致充分披露？ 决策者何时应将决策权授予专家？ 该项目的第三部分将探讨一些更广泛的影响，上述研究总结的一般问题的信息诱导不完全知情的代理人。 事实上，决策者不能合理地致力于一个行动过程，一个机制，区分这个问题，从传统上认为在机制设计理论。 特别是，与传统理论的教训相反，实现充分披露和最佳结果是困难的。