Collective Models of Household Behavior

这项研究关注的是家庭行为的“集体”模型的发展，在这个模型中，家庭被表示为由几个个体组成的群体，每个个体都有一个特定的效用函数，并且他们达成了帕累托效率协议。这种表述的目的是理解，特别是成员各自的“权力”或议价地位如何影响家庭内部消费和福利的分配，以及整个家庭行为。这对设计最佳政策具有重要意义；例如，福利是否应该以特定的形式给予特定的成员（例如，对妇女的教育）等等。第一个目标是深化这些模型的理论基础，并解决一些仍未解决的问题。研究的第二部分将致力于实证应用，特别是在劳动力供给的情况下。最后，将模型扩展到包含不确定性和动力学。

This researach is concerned with the development of 'collective' models of household behavior, where household is represented as a group of several individuals, each of whom is characterized by a specific utility function, and who make Pareto efficient agreements. Such representations aim at understanding, in particular, how the members respective 'power' or bargaining positions affect intrahousehold allocation of consumption and welfare, as well as household behavior as a whole. This has important implications for the design of optimal policies; for instance, should benefits be given to specific members, under a specific form (say, education to women), and others. A first goal is to deepen the theoretical foundations of these models, and to solve some of the questions that are still open. A second part of the research will be devoted to empirical applications, especially in the case of labor supply. Finally, the model will be extended to include uncertainty and dynamics.