Collective Models of Household Behavior

本研究关注家庭行为的“集体”模式的发展，其中家庭被表示为几个个体的群体，每个个体都具有特定的效用函数，并达成帕累托有效协议。这种陈述的目的尤其是了解成员各自的“权力”或谈判地位如何影响家庭内部的消费和福利分配，以及整个家庭行为。这对最佳政策的设计具有重要影响；例如，是否应以特定形式(例如，对妇女的教育)向特定成员提供福利，以及其他福利。第一个目标是深化这些模型的理论基础，并解决一些仍然悬而未决的问题。研究的第二部分将致力于实证应用，特别是在劳动力供应的情况下。最后，该模型将被扩展到包括不确定性和动态性。

This researach is concerned with the development of 'collective' models of household behavior, where household is represented as a group of several individuals, each of whom is characterized by a specific utility function, and who make Pareto efficient agreements. Such representations aim at understanding, in particular, how the members respective 'power' or bargaining positions affect intrahousehold allocation of consumption and welfare, as well as household behavior as a whole. This has important implications for the design of optimal policies; for instance, should benefits be given to specific members, under a specific form (say, education to women), and others. A first goal is to deepen the theoretical foundations of these models, and to solve some of the questions that are still open. A second part of the research will be devoted to empirical applications, especially in the case of labor supply. Finally, the model will be extended to include uncertainty and dynamics.