Distortion of Information During Decisions

决策过程中信息失真

• 批准号: 9730237
• 负责人: J. Russo
• 金额: --
• 依托单位: Cornell University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 1998
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 1998-08-01 至 2000-07-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=9730237&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Distortion; Information; During; Decisions

During a decision, people tend to distort new information to make it seem more favorable to the leading alternative than it really is. The present research explores this predecisional distortion of information in several ways. First, what are its causes? Is distortion a sacrifice of decision accuracy in order to preserve consistency among all evaluations, to reduce effort, or to maintain a more positive mood based on a successful progression toward a clear decision? Alternatively, is distortion caused by using consistency as a misguided signal of accuracy? Second, what are its implications? Can manipulating the order or format (but not the content) of information influence the alternative that people choose? The answer may well be yes. Third, what are the limits of information distortion? Does it extend to the evaluation of single alternatives as well as to choices, to objective decisions, to predictions of future events, to very precise information like single numbers (e.g., prices)? Finally, how can people eliminate or at least reduce information distortion so that they do not end up choosing an inferior alternative? Will warning alone work? Does the apparatus of multiattribute utilities analysis prevent distortion? And last, does deciding in a group help (or hurt)? In many important real decisions, information is acquired sequentially (e.g., filling a job, market research, and medical diagnosis). Furthermore, organizational pressure to justify the next step in the information-gathering sequence may enhance distortion (rather than detecting biased judgment). In sum, there are material implications of the information distortion phenomenon for decision making in real, consequential situations.

在决策过程中，人们倾向于扭曲新的信息，使其看起来比实际情况更有利于领先的替代方案。本研究从几个方面探讨了这种预先决定的信息扭曲现象。首先，它的原因是什么？为了保持所有评估之间的一致性，减少努力，还是为了在成功地朝着明确的决策前进的基础上保持更积极的情绪，扭曲决策是否牺牲了决策的准确性？或者，使用一致性作为准确性的误导信号是否会导致失真？第二，它的影响是什么？操纵信息的顺序或格式(但不是内容)会影响人们选择的替代方案吗？答案很可能是肯定的。第三，信息失真的限度是什么？它是否延伸到对单一备选方案的评估以及选择、客观决策、对未来事件的预测、非常精确的信息，如单一数字(例如价格)？最后，人们如何才能消除或至少减少信息扭曲，使他们最终不会选择一个劣质的替代方案？仅靠警告能奏效吗？多属性效用分析的设备能防止失真吗？最后，集体做出决定是有帮助的(还是有害的)？在许多重要的实际决策中，信息是按顺序获得的(例如，填补工作、市场调查和医疗诊断)。此外，组织为信息收集序列中的下一步辩护的压力可能会加强扭曲(而不是检测有偏见的判断)。总而言之，信息失真现象对现实中的决策有实质性的影响。