Dissertation Research: The European Court of Justice & National Courts: Strategic Interaction and the Creation of a Supranational Entity

论文研究：欧洲法院

• 批准号: 9904983
• 负责人: David O'Brien
• 金额: $ 0.91万
• 依托单位: University of Virginia Main Campus
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 1999
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 1999-08-01 至 2001-03-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=9904983&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Dissertation; Research; European; Court; Justice

This project examines strategic behavior in relation to the European Court of Justice (ECJ). Three opportunities for strategic behavior will be investigated: referral of cases by national courts, court decisions, and national court/litigant compliance with ECJ decisions. The research hypothesis to be investigated here is that both national courts and the ECJ are strategic actors, the main goals of which are to retain and increase legitimacy while at the same time to participate in the development of legal jurisprudence. In light of these goals, within the process under investigation, courts will manipulate institutional constraints in the following manner: national courts frame issues in cases sent to the ECJ, the European Court suppresses or expands issues, and national courts and litigants practice (non)compliance. These players interact in a strategic "transsemantic" game that begins at the national level and transcends this legal boundary to the European one. To test these hypotheses, the research investigates all cases brought before the ECJ for the top three referring national court systems in the following areas of law: free movement of goods, free movement of workers, and equal treatment cases within social policy. Finally, to create a basis for comparison, the research examines the issue-fluidity hypothesis with data from the U.S. Supreme Court during two periods which differ in their degree of docket control available to the Court (1865-1891 and 1988-1992).

这个项目考察了与欧洲法院(ECJ)有关的战略行为。将调查三种战略行为的机会：国家法院转介案件、法院裁决以及国家法院/诉讼人遵守欧洲法院的裁决。这里要调查的研究假设是，国家法院和欧洲法院都是战略行为者，其主要目标是保持和增加合法性，同时参与法理学的发展。根据这些目标，在调查过程中，法院将以下列方式操纵体制制约：国家法院将问题框定在提交欧洲法院的案件中，欧洲法院压制或扩大问题，以及国家法院和诉讼当事人实践(不)遵守。这些参与者在一场战略性的“跨语义”游戏中互动，这场游戏始于国家层面，超越了这一法律边界，进入了欧洲。为了验证这些假设，这项研究调查了提交给欧洲法院的所有案件，涉及以下法律领域的前三大国家法院系统：货物自由流动、工人自由流动和社会政策中的平等待遇案件。最后，为了建立比较的基础，本研究使用美国最高法院的数据检验了问题-流动性假说，这两个时期(1865-1891年和1988-1992年)的文件控制程度不同。