Doctoral Dissetation Research: The Effects of Ordering in Exchange Networks

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The proposed research investigates how ordering a series of relations affects the exercise of power in each relation. For example, the A - B - C network is ordered when B must exchange with A prior to exchanging with C. We predict that A benefits from that ordering; A gains a better exchange ratio than would have been gained if B was not constrained to exchange first with A. A familiar example of ordering is gatekeeping. A gatekeeper is an actor who controls access to valued relations and benefits from that control. For example, the International Olympics Committee (the IOC) is the sole body with the authority to locate Olympic games. Only if Olympic games are attracted will there be the lucrative businesses associated with them. IOC gatekeeps and there are recent reports that its members profit. Though ordering effects can occur across many kinds of relations, exchange networks provide a well proven context for their investigation. Models for an array of orderings are developed. Using resistance equations, predictions for the models are generated and nine experiments are proposed. These experiments are intended to demonstrate the effect of ordering on exchange ratios and to determine how ordering interacts with other structural power conditions.