Topics in Auctions and Contractual Arrangements in Procurement

这个项目有两个目标。首先，将制订一个比较现实的计算、确定和估计投标模式的框架，以便应用于研究美国公共部门采购制度的运作。将采用一种框架，允许竞标者在拍卖开始前以不同的方式被理解。竞标者的异质性在许多实际应用中是一个关键的经验问题。例如，在公共工程的建设中，各公司往往因地点、专门从事的工作类型、目前的积压和管理效率而有所不同。因此，在投标开始前，所有代理人都了解的某些项目上，公司将具有成本优势或劣势。不对称的第二个重要来源是串通。卡特尔的成本分布将不同于竞争边缘，这一事实可能有助于从经验上区分串通投标和竞争性投标。这个项目的扩展将包括内生企业的参与决策，因为内生参与显然是建模现实主义所需要的。此外，由于合谋的一种形式是选择不与另一个卡特尔成员竞标，因此需要对参与建模，以了解竞争性和合谋投标模式之间的区别。另一种扩展是利用投标的经验分布只有在企业竞争时才能在基础模型参数中交换的结果来经验地区分竞争和勾结。最后，建立了动态招标采购模型。这是一个重要的经验考虑，因为在许多应用中，企业将受到能力限制。还将拟订一个关于采购中通常使用的替代合同安排的成本和效益的模型。在工程和施工管理文献中，关于建筑施工中成本加成和固定价格合同的成本和收益，合同形式的灵活性以适应变化的条件是一个中心问题。该模型的核心是在提供降低成本的激励和节省两种交易成本之间进行权衡。第一个成本是提供描述项目的综合设计。第二个成本是由于对原始设计进行昂贵的重新谈判。该模型能够从建筑行业的私营部门复制一些基本的程式化事实。当总完工时间最小化时，首选成本加合同，合同开始前的计划往往不太完整。如果最小化项目总成本是最重要的，那么提供更详细的计划，并倾向于固定价格合同。此外，更复杂的项目通常由成本加成合同管理。

The goals of this project are twofold. First, a more realistic framework for computa-tion, identification and estimation of bidding models that can be applied to studying the workings of the public sector procurement system in the United States will be developed. A framework that allows for bidders to be heterogeneous in ways that are understood before the auction begins will be used. Bidder heterogeneity is a key empirical problem in many real world applications. For example, in the construction of public works, firms often differ by location, the type of work that they specialize in, their current backlog and their managerial efficiency. As a result, firms will have cost advantages or disadvantages on certain projects that are understood by all agents before bidding begins. A second important source of asymmetries is collusion. A cartel will have a different distribution of costs than a competitive fringe and this fact may help to empirically identify between collusive and competitive bidding. Extensions of this project will include endogenizing the participation decision of firms since endogenizing participation is clearly needed for modeling realism. Also, since one form of collusion is to choose not to bid against another cartel member, modeling participation is needed to understand the difference between competitive and collusive bidding patterns. Another extension is to use the result that the empirical distribution of bids is exchangeable in the underlying model parameters only if the firms are competitive to empirically to distinguish between competition and collusion. Finally, a model of dynamic bidding in procurement will be built. This is an important empirical consideration, since in many applications, firms will be capacity constrained. A model of the costs and benefits of alternative contractual arrangements that are commonly used in procurement will also be developed. In the engineering and construction management literature on the costs and benefits of cost-plus and fixed price contracting in building construction, the flexibility of the contractual form to adjust to changed conditions is a central concern. The centerpiece of the model is a trade-off between providing cost-reducing incentives, and saving on transaction costs of two kinds. The first cost is that of providing a comprehensive design that describes the project. The second cost is due to costly renegotiation of the original design. The model is able to replicate some basic stylized facts from the private sector of the construction industry. When total completion time is to be minimized cost plus contracting is preferred and planning before contracting begins tends to be less complete. If minimizing total project costs is of the essence, then more detailed plans are provided and fixed price contracting is favored. Also, more complex projects are more often governed by cost-plus contracts.