Dissertation Research: Economic Liberalization and the Expansion of Judicial Power in Contemporary Egypt

该提案试图解释为什么埃及政府建立了一个独立的宪法法院，而该法院越来越限制其控制政权反对者的能力。PI假设，宪法法院是由政权建立的，以鼓励私人投资于埃及新自由化的经济，法院已经能够承受来自行政分支越来越大的压力，通过支持政权的经济自由化计划，并通过与反对党，法律的协会和商业团体培养重要的支持网络。 这项研究的目的是考虑到几个理论发展的目标：评估经济自由化对发展中国家的国家司法机构的影响;更好地了解法律的机构在经济发展中的作用;并增加了解的条件下，独立的司法机构出现在非自由的政治。 为了验证这些假设，PI将在埃及开罗进行为期12个月的研究，并将分析宪法法院的案件，以寻找法院在经济和政治问题领域的能动性证据。 案件将根据其对制度的影响以及法官对与战略行为有关的其他方面的影响进行编码。 PI还将跟踪裁决的样本，以确定执行法院裁决的障碍。

This proposal seeks to explain why the Egyptian government established an independent constitutional court that has increasingly constrained its ability to control opponents of the regime. The PI hypothesizes that the constitutional court was established by the regime in order to encourage private investment in Egypt's newly liberalized economy and that the court has been able to withstand increasing pressure from the executive branch by supporting the regime's economic liberalization program and by cultivating important networks of support with opposition parties, legal associations, and business groups. This study is designed with several theory-development goals in mind: to assess the impact of economic liberalization upon national judicial institutions in the developing world; to better understand the role of legal institutions in economic development; and to increase understanding of the conditions under which independent judicial institutions emerge from within non-liberal polities. To test these hypotheses, the PI will conduct 12 months of research in Cairo, Egypt and will analyze constitutional court cases for evidence of court activism over time and across economic and political issue areas. Cases will be coded according to their impact on the regime and on other dimensions relevant to strategic behavior by the judges. The PI will also trace a sample of rulings to ascertain impediments to the implementation of court rulings.