Dissertation Research: Economic Liberalization and the Expansion of Judicial Power in Contemporary Egypt

这个提议试图解释为什么埃及政府建立了一个独立的宪法法院，这个法院越来越限制了它控制政权反对者的能力。PI假设，宪法法院是由政权建立的，目的是鼓励私人投资埃及新自由化的经济，法院通过支持政权的经济自由化计划，并通过与反对党、法律协会和商业团体建立重要的支持网络，能够承受来自行政部门越来越大的压力。这项研究的设计考虑到几个理论发展目标：评估经济自由化对发展中国家国家司法机构的影响；更好地理解法律制度在经济发展中的作用；并增进对独立司法机构从非自由政治中产生的条件的理解。为了验证这些假设，PI将在埃及开罗进行为期12个月的研究，并将分析宪法法院案件，以寻找法院在经济和政治问题领域的能动主义的证据。案件将根据其对制度的影响和对法官战略行为有关的其他方面的影响进行编码。调查团还将追查裁决的样本，以确定执行法院裁决的障碍。

This proposal seeks to explain why the Egyptian government established an independent constitutional court that has increasingly constrained its ability to control opponents of the regime. The PI hypothesizes that the constitutional court was established by the regime in order to encourage private investment in Egypt's newly liberalized economy and that the court has been able to withstand increasing pressure from the executive branch by supporting the regime's economic liberalization program and by cultivating important networks of support with opposition parties, legal associations, and business groups. This study is designed with several theory-development goals in mind: to assess the impact of economic liberalization upon national judicial institutions in the developing world; to better understand the role of legal institutions in economic development; and to increase understanding of the conditions under which independent judicial institutions emerge from within non-liberal polities. To test these hypotheses, the PI will conduct 12 months of research in Cairo, Egypt and will analyze constitutional court cases for evidence of court activism over time and across economic and political issue areas. Cases will be coded according to their impact on the regime and on other dimensions relevant to strategic behavior by the judges. The PI will also trace a sample of rulings to ascertain impediments to the implementation of court rulings.