Underdetermination, Real Antirealism and a New Induction on the History of Science

对科学实在论的现有挑战[我们的科学理论应该被理解为(至少是近似地)对难以触及的自然领域的真实描述]的主张广泛地利用了“证据对理论的不确定论”的主张(即，我们的证据总是不足以支持现有的理论，而不是由该证据同样很好地证实了其他可能性)，或者是对许多过去的科学理论的“悲观归纳”，尽管这些理论展示了我们可能采用的相同的证据和实践的优点，但事实证明这些理论是错误的，尽管我们可能会采取相同的证据和实践美德来证实现在的理论。斯坦福博士建议挑战现有辩论的框架，并通过在一系列相关论文中展开以下论点来为反实在论进行新的辩护，这将成为未来一本书的核心。首先，斯坦福博士认为，现有关于缺乏判断力的讨论几乎只关注与现有理论假定的“经验等价物”的存在和地位是错误的：生成此类等价物的流行算法只是用缺乏判断力的问题来换取熟悉的哲学栗子(特别是笛卡尔怀疑论或虚假确认问题)，而为数不多的令人信服的经验主义等价物的例子根本不会支持缺乏判断力的支持者希望得出的令人陶醉的道德说教。然而，斯坦福大学辩称，现实主义同样受到经验上不等价的假设的前景的威胁，这些假设仍然得到了我们手中所有实际证据的充分证实，就像现有的理论一样，只要我们考虑的每个理论和证据都会再次出现这种短暂的决定不足困境。此外，他还引用了《科学史上的新归纳法》，认为这种反复出现的、短暂的决定不足的困境是我们自己的。《新归纳》并没有简单地指出过去成功的理论的错误，而是指出，在整个科学探究的历史中，在几乎每个科学领域，我们反复占据着一种认识论的地位，在这种地位中，我们只能设想一个或几个理论，这些理论得到了现有证据的充分证实，而随后的调查例行公事地揭示了进一步理论的存在，就像我们根据当时可用的证据所接受的那样，当时可用的全部证据也证实了这些理论的存在。他针对潜在的反对意见为这一新归纳法辩护，并辩称，在科学研究文献中有影响力的独特的整体论主张，最好被视为支持同样的新归纳法的一个版本。最后，斯坦福博士为新归纳法和最初的悲观归纳法进行了辩护，反对最近颇具影响力的现实主义科学史读物，后者认为过去理论的真实特征或方面是导致它们成功的原因。作为回应，斯坦福博士辩称，这种匹配实际上是因为现实主义者呼吁一个共同的参照点(我们目前的理论信念)来判断过去成功的理论是正确的，以及什么特征是其成功的原因。

Project Abstract: 00-94001Preston StanfordUnderdetermination, Real Antirealism, and a New Induction on the History of ScienceExisting challenges to Scientific Realism [the position that our scientific theories should be understood as (at least approximately) true descriptions of the inaccessible domains of nature] have made extensive use of either the claim of the "Underdetermination of Theories by Evidence" (i.e. that our evidence is invariably insufficient to favor existing theories over alternative possibilities equally well confirmed by that very evidence) or of the "Pessimistic Induction" over the many past scientific theories that have turned out to be false despite exhibiting the same evidential and practical virtues that we might take to confirm present theories. Dr. Stanford proposes to challenge the framework of the existing debate and to pursue a new defense of Antirealism by developing the following line of argument in a series of connected papers forming the core of a future book.First, Dr. Stanford argues that it is a mistake for existing discussions of underdetermination to focus almost exclusively on the existence and status of putative "empirical equivalents" to existing theories: popular algorithms for generating such equivalents simply trade in the problem of underdetermination for familiar philosophical chestnuts (in particular, Cartesian skepticism or the problem of spurious confirmation), while the few convincing examples of empirical equivalents simply will not support the intoxicating morals that champions of underdetermination have hoped to draw. Stanford argues, however, that Realism is no less threatened by the prospect of empirically inequivalent hypotheses that are nonetheless equally well-confirmed by all the actual evidence we have in hand as are existing theories, so long as such a transient underdetermination predicament recurs for each theory and body of evidence we consider. Furthermore, he appeals to a New Induction on the History of Science to argue that this predicament of recurrent, transient underdetermination is our own. Rather than simply pointing to the falsity of past successful theories, the New Induction points out that we have, throughout the history of scientific inquiry and in virtually every scientific field, repeatedly occupied an epistemic position in which we could conceive of only one or a few theories that were well-confirmed by the available evidence, while subsequent inquiry has routinely revealed the existence of further theories just as well confirmed by the totality of evidence then available as were those we accepted on the strength of that very evidence. He defends this New Induction against potential objections and argue that the distinctively holist claim of underdetermination influential in the science studies literature is best seen as supporting a version of this same New Induction. Finally, Dr. Stanford defends both the New Induction and the original Pessimistic Induction against the recently influential Realist reading of the history of science which finds the true features or aspects of past theories to be those responsible for their success, arguing in reply that this match is virtually guaranteed by the fact that the Realist appeals to a common point of reference (our current theoretical beliefs) in judging both what a past successful theory got right and what features were responsible for its success.