Contractual issues in the financing of new firms: macroeconomic and policy implications

本建议中所述的研究旨在了解用于资助新公司的合同安排与其增长和总体经济波动之间的联系。吸引外部资金的能力对于创建新公司和扩大现有公司至关重要。因此，放款人与公司之间的金融安排的性质对公司的成长具有重要影响。 它还可能对总体冲击的传播和总体经济的波动产生重要影响。这个研究项目有三个目标。首先，它研究了契约问题如何影响新公司的最优融资及其随后的增长。第二，它评估了这些合同问题的福利成本，因为它们导致了资源的低效率配置，并研究了减轻这些福利后果的政策或制度的类型。第三，研究宏观经济中的契约问题如何影响新投资机会的传播。为了实现这一目标，本课题综合了两种主要方法，研究金融摩擦对企业投资行为的影响。第一种方法集中在阻碍市场完整性的摩擦的主要来源，以及这种不完整性对个体企业行为的影响。然而，它没有考虑到宏观经济的相关问题。第二种方法关注市场不完全性的总体影响。鉴于其总体焦点，在这种方法中，市场的不完全性是外生的，而不是内生的。由于这些模型的性质主要取决于所假设的金融摩擦类型，因此这些摩擦在模型中是内生产生的，而不是由假设强加的。这对于设计旨在改善有限的契约性所造成的低效率的政策和体制安排尤其重要。该项目通过开发一个具有不完全性的坚实微观基础的一般均衡模型，将现有的金融市场不完全性研究方法结合起来。创业者有能力长期经营一个创业项目，但需要外部资金来资助投资。通过最优长期合同与贷方建立长期关系解决了融资问题。市场的不完全性源于企业家拒绝金融契约的能力（即源于契约的有限可执行性）。 通过整合现有的方法来研究市场的不完全性，该模型能够解决理论和政策相关的问题。一般均衡结构有助于评估市场不完全性的福利成本，而微观基础则允许分析能够支持上级资源配置的政策或体制安排类型。

The research described in this proposal is directed to understanding the link between the contractual arrangements used to finance new firms and their growth and the volatility of the aggregate economy. The ability to attract external financing is crucial for the creation of new firms and the expansion of existing ones. For that reason the nature of the financial arrangements between lenders and firms has important consequences for the growth of firms. It also can have important consequences for the propagation of aggregate shocks and the volatility of the aggregate economy. This research project has three objectives. First, it studies how contractual problems affect the optimal financing of new firms and their subsequent growth. Second, it evaluates the welfare costs of these contractual problems that result because they induce an inefficient allocation of resources and studies the type of policies or institutions that alleviate these welfare consequences. Third, it studies how contractual problems affect the propagation of new investment opportunities in the macro-economy.To pursue these objectives, the project integrates the two main approaches to studying the impact of financial frictions on the investment behavior of firms. The first approach focuses on the primary sources of frictions that prevent market completeness, and the implications of this incompleteness for the behavior of individual firms. It fails to consider, however, issues of macroeconomic relevance. The second approach is concerned with the aggregate implications of market incompleteness. Given its aggregate focus, in this approach market incomplete-ness is exogenously imposed, rather than derived endogenously. Because the properties of these models depend critically on the type of financial frictions assumed, it is desirable that these frictions are endogenously generated in the model rather than imposed by assumption. This is especially important for the design of policies and institutional arrangements aimed at improving the inefficiencies generated by limited contractability.The project integrates the existing approaches to the study of financial market incompleteness, by developing a general equilibrium model with a solid micro-foundation for the incompleteness. Entrepreneurs have the ability to run an entrepreneurial project over a long time but need external funds to finance investment. Entering into a long-term relationship with a lender through an optimal long-term contract solves the financing problem. Market incompleteness derives from the ability of the entrepreneur to repudiate the financial contract (i.e. from the limited enforceability of contracts). By integrating the existing approaches to the study of market incompleteness, the model is able to address theoretical and policy-related questions. The general equilibrium structure facilitates the evaluation of the welfare costs of market incompleteness, while the micro-foundations permit the analysis of the type of policies or institutional arrangements that can support a superior allocation of resources.