Bank Relationships and the Misallocation of Credit

银行关系和信贷配置不当

• 批准号: 0213967
• 负责人: Joe Peek
• 金额: $ 15.58万
• 依托单位: University of Kentucky Research Foundation
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Continuing Grant
• 财政年份: 2002
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2002-08-01 至 2005-07-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0213967&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Bank; Relationships; Misallocation; Credit

The severe economic crisis in Japan, associated with the collapse of the Japanese stock and real estate markets and the dramatic deterioration in the health of the Japanese banking sector, represents one of the major economic events of the late twentieth century. It is even more striking because the second largest economy in the world remained stagnant for more than a decade, and even today shows no evidence of returning to the robust health that characterized most of its postwar history. Why this economic weakness has persisted for so long is an important public policy issue and has been the source of substantial speculation and debate, with problems in the financial sector likely being a key contributor. In particular, the misallocation of credit by troubled Japanese banks associated with pressures emanating from their historical ties to troubled firms may be a key contributor to the continuing stagnation of the Japanese economy. Two forms of corporate affiliations are the focus of this study: bank-centered financial (horizontal) keiretsus and the main bank system. A concern is that these corporate affiliations have subverted corporate governance, insulating firms from the discipline that otherwise would come from outside directors, shareholders, and creditors, resulting in suboptimal business and financial decisions. While previous studies have examined how these corporate affiliations affect investment decisions, stock returns, and corporate governance decisions, they have not directly examined how such affiliations impact the availability of credit. This study will utilize a unique firm-level database that enables an examination of loans to firms to determine the extent to which such finance is affected by corporate affiliations, as well as the implications for macroeconomic activity and the effectiveness of monetary policy of any such misallocation of credit. The study has three main objectives. The first, and primary, objective is to investigate the impact of main bank and keiretsu affiliations on credit allocation during periods of firm and/or bank distress. Preliminary evidence suggests that credit has been misallocated due to pressures from keiretsu and main bank ties, and that this misallocation has been allowed, and even encouraged, by government policies. The second objective is to investigate the macroeconomic implications of this credit misallocation, in particular focusing on its contribution to the continuing stagnation of economic activity in Japan. The third objective is to investigate the contribution of the troubled banking sector to the breakdown of the monetary policy transmission mechanism, and thus to the inability of monetary policy to restart the Japanese economy. This study has important implications for appropriate policies to deal with banking crises, as well as the costs of inappropriate policies. If scarce credit is allocated to uncompetitive and troubled firms, Japan will not experience the natural cleansing which results from the major restructuring that typically occurs in an economic downturn, with the consequence that longer-run economic growth may be reduced. In that instance, it may not be that economic growth is stifled from too little overall credit, but rather from scarce credit being allocated to firms with the least productive investment opportunities. When this misallocation of credit is combined with declining total domestic bank loans due to pressures on banks having difficulties achieving their capital requirements, the transmission of monetary policy can be short-circuited. Furthermore, given that the Japanese economy remains the second largest in the world, resolving the crisis is important for the economic prospects for other countries, especially those in East Asia.

日本严重的经济危机，伴随着日本股票和真实的房地产市场的崩溃以及日本银行部门健康状况的急剧恶化，是二十世纪后期的重大经济事件之一。 更令人震惊的是，世界第二大经济体在过去十多年里一直停滞不前，即使在今天，也没有迹象表明它恢复了战后大部分时期的强劲健康。 为什么这种经济疲软持续了这么长时间是一个重要的公共政策问题，也是大量猜测和辩论的根源，金融部门的问题可能是一个关键因素。 特别是，陷入困境的日本银行由于与陷入困境的公司的历史联系而产生的压力，导致信贷分配不当，这可能是日本经济持续停滞的一个关键因素。 本研究的重点是两种形式的企业从属关系：以银行为中心的金融（横向）keiretsus和主银行系统。 一个令人担忧的问题是，这些公司附属关系破坏了公司治理，使公司免受外部董事、股东和债权人的约束，导致商业和财务决策不理想。 虽然以前的研究已经研究了这些公司的联系如何影响投资决策，股票收益和公司治理决策，他们没有直接研究这种联系如何影响信贷的可用性。 这项研究将利用一个独特的企业一级的数据库，使审查贷款的公司，以确定在何种程度上，这种融资受到公司的从属关系，以及对宏观经济活动的影响和货币政策的有效性，任何这种信贷分配不当。 这项研究有三个主要目标。 第一个，也是主要的，目的是调查在公司和/或银行困境期间，主要银行和经连会的关系对信贷分配的影响。 初步证据表明，由于来自经连会和主要银行关系的压力，信贷被错误分配，这种错误分配是政府政策允许甚至鼓励的。 第二个目标是调查这种信贷分配不当的宏观经济影响，特别是关注其对日本经济活动持续停滞的贡献。 第三个目标是调查陷入困境的银行业对货币政策传导机制的破坏，从而对货币政策无法重启日本经济的贡献。 这项研究对制定适当的政策来应对银行危机以及不适当政策的成本具有重要意义。 如果将稀缺的信贷分配给缺乏竞争力和陷入困境的企业，日本将无法经历在经济衰退时通常会发生的大规模重组所带来的自然净化，其结果可能会降低长期经济增长。 在这种情况下，经济增长可能不是因为总体信贷太少而受到抑制，而是因为稀缺的信贷被分配给了生产性投资机会最少的公司。 当这种信贷分配不当与国内银行贷款总额下降（由于银行面临压力，难以达到其资本要求）相结合时，货币政策的传导可能会短路。 此外，鉴于日本经济仍居世界第二位，解决危机对其他国家，特别是东亚国家的经济前景具有重要意义。