Analyzing Critical Infrastructure Dependencies: Security and Survivability Effects in the Service Sector

分析关键基础设施依赖性：服务行业的安全和生存性影响

• 批准号: 0223255
• 负责人: Chris Hendrickson
• 金额: $ 14.92万
• 依托单位: Carnegie-Mellon University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2002
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2002-09-15 至 2004-12-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0223255&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Analyzing; Critical; Infrastructure; Dependencies; Security

Discussions about infrastructure security and survivability require system-wide comparisons and interdisciplinary approaches. Our consideration of survivability focuses on large-scale economic implications of attacks or vulnerabilities on major infrastructure sectors as defined by the Department of Commerce. We explore the critical connections between core service infrastructure sectors (e.g., telecommunications, electricity, and pipelines) using a total supply chain analysis model originally developed to estimate environmental and energy effects of production in the U.S.We propose to use publicly available data from the Department of Commerce's Bureau of Economic Analysis to show the actual economic dependencies between critical infrastructures and the service economy in general. The input-output tables of the U.S. economy detail the economic purchases that result between all 500 domestic economic sectors. Specifically, these tables show how much output is generated by each of the sectors, and the amounts of product other sectors purchase from each sector. For example, the model can show not only which sectors use electricity but also how much dollar value of electricity is used to produce goods or services in that sector. These data are real and tangible representations of how dependent service sector businesses are to other businesses within the infrastructure sector and the economy in general.Of course, the sectors of most interest to us when discussing vulnerabilities are sectors involved with critical infrastructure such as the information sector. Analysis of this kind can lead to new approaches to resource allocation for investments to assure infrastructure capabilities. To this end, we will contribute to the national dialogue on pending threats and risks as a result of targeted infrastructure attacks by providing a quantitative assessment tool that shows the potential connection and failure points present in the economy.

关于基础设施安全和生存能力的讨论需要全系统的比较和跨学科的做法。我们对生存能力的考虑重点是根据商务部的定义，攻击或漏洞对主要基础设施部门的大规模经济影响。我们使用全供应链分析模型来探索核心服务基础设施部门(例如电信、电力和管道)之间的关键联系，该模型最初是为了估计美国生产的环境和能源影响而开发的。我们建议使用来自商务部经济分析局的公开数据来展示关键基础设施和总体服务经济之间的实际经济依赖关系。美国经济的投入产出表详细说明了所有500个国内经济部门之间的经济购买。具体地说，这些表格显示了每个部门产生了多少产出，以及其他部门从每个部门购买了多少产品。例如，该模型不仅可以显示哪些部门使用电力，还可以显示该部门生产商品或服务所用的美元电价。这些数据真实而具体地反映了服务业企业对基础设施行业和整体经济中其他企业的依赖程度。当然，在讨论脆弱性时，我们最感兴趣的行业是与关键基础设施相关的行业，如信息行业。这类分析可以产生新的资源分配办法，用于投资，以确保基础设施能力。为此，我们将通过提供一种量化评估工具，显示经济中存在的潜在联系和故障点，从而促进关于有针对性的基础设施攻击造成的潜在威胁和风险的全国对话。