Social Interactions and Disability Benefits: What Can We Learn from Layoffs?

1984年至2001年间，美国领取社会保障残疾保险项目现金福利的非老年人比例上升了60%，达到530万人。结果，2002年残障保险的总支出超过650亿美元，几乎占美国联邦预算的3.4%。本研究使用独特的挪威数据集实证调查了社会互动对残障人士参与残障计划（如残障补助）的影响程度。社会互动效应可以帮助解释不同地区和不同时期DI参与的巨大差异。这种影响的程度对于预测残保政策和经济冲击对残保参与率的影响至关重要。社会互动效应是指一个人的行为对另一个人的行为产生的影响。例如，在残障人士的背景下，这种相互依赖可能是由于社会规范而产生的。反对残障保险使用的社会规范通过对受助人施加效用成本或污名，可以降低参与率。随着同龄人中残障人士使用残障人士的增加，这种耻辱感预计会下降，从而增加了高残障人士群体成员申请残障人士福利的倾向。由于对遗漏变量偏差的怀疑，在观测数据中识别社会互动效应是出了名的困难。这个问题将使用一个丰富的11年面板数据集来解决，该数据集包含挪威每个人的残疾参与记录。将采用一种新的工具变量（IV）策略，使用前几年同伴群体裁员作为改变群体参与率的工具。这种方法背后的直觉是，如果社会互动效应存在，受到裁员不成比例打击的同龄人群体，即使在自己没有被解雇的成员中，也应该表现出残疾申请的相对增加。本研究的结果可以为美国社会保障体系的制定提供重要的见解。

Between 1984 and 2001, the share of non-elderly adults receiving cash benefits under the Social Security Disability Insurance program (DI) in the US rose by 60 percent to 5.3 million beneficiaries. As a result, total outlays under DI exceeded $65 billion in 2002, comprising almost 3.4% of the U.S. federal budget. This research empirically investigates the extent to which social interactions affect participation in disability programs such as DI using a unique Norwegian data set. Social interaction effects could help explain the wide variation in DI participation across regions and over time. The magnitude of such effects is critically important for predicting the impact of DI policy and economic shocks on DI participation rates. Social interaction effects refer to the impact that the behavior of one individual has on the behavior of another. In the context of DI, this interdependence could, for example, arise because of social norms. Social norms against DI utilization can reduce participation rates by imposing a utility cost or stigma on recipients. As DI use increases among one's peers, this stigma is expected to decline, thereby increasing the propensity to apply for DI benefits for members of high-utilization peer groups. Identifying social interaction effects in observational data is notoriously difficult due to suspicions of omitted variable bias. This problem will be addressed using a rich 11-year panel dataset containing disability participation records for every person in Norway. A novel instrumental variable (IV) strategy will be employed, using previous years peer groups layoffs as an instrument for changes in-group participation rates. Theintuition behind this approach is that f social interaction effects exist, peer groups disproportionately hit by layoffs should exhibit a relative increase in disability applications even among members who were not themselves laid off. The results of this research could provide important insights into the formulation of social safety net programs in the US.