Byzantine Replication for Trustworthy Systems

值得信赖系统的拜占庭复制

• 批准号: 0430510
• 负责人: Lorenzo Alvisi
• 金额: $ 30万
• 依托单位: University of Texas at Austin
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2004
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2004-09-15 至 2007-08-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0430510&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Byzantine; Replication; Trustworthy; Systems

Proposal number: 0430510TITLE: Byzantine Replication for Trustworthy ServicesPrincipal Investigator: Lorenzo AlvisiIn a world where economics dictates that few components be rigorously tested or verified, methods for building trustworthy systems from untrustworthy components are essential. An attractive approach toward managing the complexity inherent in building trustworthy distributed systems consists in modeling a compromised component as faulty according to the Byzantine failure model---the weakest of all failure models, which allows faulty components to deviate arbitrarily and maliciously from their correct specification. This research explores the feasibility of this approach, both with respect to its fundamental assumptions and to its engineering viability. On the first front, the focus is on (1) the challenge of conjugating fault-tolerance and privacy by developing a firewall with formally verifiable privacy guarantees and (2) the establishment of a solid, quantitative basis for measuring failure independence of replicas against security attacks in Byzantine fault-tolerant architectures. On the second front, the emphasis is on exploring novel ways to implement Byzantine services that provide low latency, high throughput, and can be quickly and unobtrusively reconfigured to improve their performance in response to changes in the environment in which they operate. Addressing these issues successfully will enable a strategy for assembling untrustworthy components to obtain trustworthy systems. More broadly, the proposed research will impact both graduate and undergraduate curriculum at UT Austin and will contribute towards creating a UT Center for Information Security.

提案编号：0430510标题：Byzantine Replication for Trustworthy ServicesPrincipal Investigator：Lorenzo Alfred在一个经济学要求很少有组件需要严格测试或验证的世界中，从不值得信赖的组件构建值得信赖的系统的方法至关重要。 一个有吸引力的方法来管理在构建值得信赖的分布式系统固有的复杂性，包括在建模一个受损的组件作为故障根据拜占庭故障模型-最弱的所有故障模型，它允许故障组件偏离任意和恶意地从他们正确的规范。本研究探讨了这种方法的可行性，无论是在其基本假设和工程可行性。在第一个方面，重点是（1）共轭容错和隐私的挑战，通过开发一个防火墙与正式验证的隐私保证和（2）建立一个坚实的，定量的基础，测量故障独立性的副本对拜占庭容错架构的安全攻击。 在第二个方面，重点是探索实现拜占庭服务的新方法，这些服务提供低延迟，高吞吐量，并且可以快速，不显眼地重新配置，以提高其性能，以响应其运行环境的变化。 成功地解决这些问题将使一个战略，组装不值得信赖的组件，以获得值得信赖的系统。 更广泛地说，拟议的研究将影响UT奥斯汀的研究生和本科生课程，并将有助于创建UT信息安全中心。