Multi-Agent Mechanism Design under Non-Commitment

非承诺下的多Agent机制设计

• 批准号: 0451365
• 负责人: Vasiliki Skreta
• 金额: $ 2万
• 依托单位: University of California-Los Angeles
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2004
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2004-11-01 至 2005-10-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0451365&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Multi; Agent; Mechanism; Design; under

This SGER award will fund a young investigator as she works to develop a richer model of mechanism design. This branch of economic theory has multiple applications in labor economics, industrial economics, and public economics. Her goal is to introduce a new element into the theory; she will build and analyze a model in which a principal specifies a payment rule for several agents, but retains the ability to change the payment rule at a later date. The award will fund the PI as she works to determine if the basic research approach is sound. Introducing non-commitment into multi-agent mechanism design should have important implications for how to otpimally design auctions, how to design efficient payment and promotion schemes, and how to develop a system of sanctions and rewards to achieve desired public policy outcomes.

该 SGER 奖项将资助一位年轻的研究人员，帮助她开发更丰富的机制设计模型。 这一经济理论分支在劳动经济学、产业经济学和公共经济学中有多种应用。 她的目标是在理论中引入新的元素；她将构建并分析一个模型，其中委托人为多个代理指定付款规则，但保留以后更改付款规则的能力。 该奖项将为 PI 提供资金，帮助她确定基础研究方法是否合理。 将不承诺引入多主体机制设计对于如何优化设计拍卖、如何设计有效的支付和促销方案以及如何制定制裁和奖励制度以实现预期的公共政策结果应该具有重要意义。