Multi-Agent Mechanism Design under Non-Commitment

这个SGER奖将资助一位年轻的研究者，因为她致力于开发一个更丰富的机制设计模型。这一经济理论分支在劳动经济学、产业经济学和公共经济学中有多种应用。她的目标是在理论中引入一个新元素；她将构建并分析一个模型，在这个模型中，一个主体为几个代理指定支付规则，但保留在以后更改支付规则的能力。在她努力确定基础研究方法是否合理时，该奖项将为PI提供资金。在多主体机制设计中引入非承诺性，对于如何以最佳方式设计拍卖、如何设计有效的付款和促销方案，以及如何制定一种制裁和奖励制度以实现预期的公共政策结果，应该具有重要意义。

This SGER award will fund a young investigator as she works to develop a richer model of mechanism design. This branch of economic theory has multiple applications in labor economics, industrial economics, and public economics. Her goal is to introduce a new element into the theory; she will build and analyze a model in which a principal specifies a payment rule for several agents, but retains the ability to change the payment rule at a later date. The award will fund the PI as she works to determine if the basic research approach is sound. Introducing non-commitment into multi-agent mechanism design should have important implications for how to otpimally design auctions, how to design efficient payment and promotion schemes, and how to develop a system of sanctions and rewards to achieve desired public policy outcomes.