Fraud-proof Mechanism Design

防欺诈机制设计

基本信息

  • 批准号:
    2242521
  • 负责人:
  • 金额:
    $ 27.97万
  • 依托单位:
  • 依托单位国家:
    美国
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant
  • 财政年份:
    2023
  • 资助国家:
    美国
  • 起止时间:
    2023-09-01 至 2026-08-31
  • 项目状态:
    未结题

项目摘要

This research focuses on designing better contracts and auction mechanisms in contexts where agents can engage in costly (or risky) fraud. The project extends the theory of mechanism design (which is often considered as the engineering side of economics.). Specifically, this work improves our understanding of the allocation of public housing units, seats in selective schools, human organs, and other goods whose assignments are done without monetary transfers and may be affected by falsified applications. Eligibility is usually based on a score (metric) that proxies the social value of assigning a unit to an individual. However, reliance on the metric creates strong incentives to game it. As a result, practices such as forgery, greenwashing, teaching to the test, or manipulating statistics are commonplace. Infamous examples include doctors escalating their patients' treatments to increase their priority on organ waiting lists, families using a fake address to gain access to a desirable public school, and the various elaborate ways well-off parents facilitated admissions of their children to highly selective universities in the US during the college admissions scandal. Gaming the system leads to misallocation, unfair outcomes, and erodes public trust. Socio-economic groups better at gaming achieve faster access to organ transplants, better school assignments for their children, and so forth. The misallocations are not only unfair but they can also cost lives in some cases. The researcher develops procedures that maximize allocative efficiency while being fraud-proof, meaning individuals cannot benefit from gaming their scores.In contrast to the majority of the mechanism design literature, which assumes that misreporting is costless, the research funded by this award characterizes agents by their natural score, which they can falsify at a cost, and by other privately-known dimensions (tastes, gaming abilities) that they can misrepresent at no cost. The analysis shows how one can leverage falsification costs to design optimal allocation procedures. The developed solution methodology complements techniques stemming from Myerson (1981), which have been widely applied to settings with transfers, as well as the Lagrangian techniques employed by Amador et al. (2006) and others for settings without transfers. The research program suggests a pioneering way of tackling problems of mechanism design without transfers and costly fraud, highlighting novel connections to the literature of optimal transportation theory. Within economics, it extends the main mechanism design paradigm by allowing agents' private information to have 'hard' (costly to misreport) and 'soft' (free to misreport) dimensions. The setting and insights we provide can be applied to the design of rating systems based on which federal funds are allocated (for example, rating systems for Medicaid providers and nursing homes). They can also be applied to the design of accounting and taxation standards. All these systems are often plagued by gaming and manipulations, making our modeling based on costly type falsification relevant. The project also has interdisciplinary impacts on computer science. Computer science theory is concerned with algorithmic manipulations. Given that such manipulations can be costly and that the abstract modeling of algorithms resembles that of mechanisms without transfers, the modeling and solution approach can be applied to the design of manipulation-proof algorithms.This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.
本研究的重点是在代理人可能参与代价高昂(或有风险)欺诈的情况下,设计更好的合同和拍卖机制。该项目扩展了机制设计理论(通常被认为是经济学的工程方面)。具体来说,这项工作提高了我们对公共住房单位分配、择优录取、人体器官和其他物品分配的理解,这些物品的分配是在没有货币转移的情况下完成的,可能受到伪造申请的影响。资格通常是基于一个分数(度量标准),它代表了将单位分配给个人的社会价值。然而,对指标的依赖会产生强烈的游戏动机。因此,伪造、洗绿、应试教学或操纵统计数据等做法屡见不鲜。臭名昭著的例子包括医生升级病人的治疗,以提高他们在器官等待名单上的优先权,家庭使用假地址进入理想的公立学校,以及在大学录取丑闻期间,富裕的父母通过各种精心设计的方式帮助他们的孩子进入美国的名牌大学。玩弄制度会导致分配不当、结果不公平,并侵蚀公众的信任。擅长游戏的社会经济群体可以更快地获得器官移植,为他们的孩子提供更好的学校作业等等。分配不当不仅不公平,在某些情况下还会造成生命损失。研究人员开发了一种程序,可以最大限度地提高配置效率,同时防止欺诈,这意味着个人无法从他们的分数中获益。与大多数机制设计文献(假设误报是没有成本的)相反,由该奖项资助的研究通过他们的自然得分来描述代理,他们可以以成本来伪造,以及通过其他私人已知的维度(口味,游戏能力)来描述代理,他们可以不花任何成本。分析显示了如何利用伪造成本来设计最优分配程序。开发的解决方法补充了源自Myerson(1981)的技术,该技术已广泛应用于有转移的环境,以及Amador等人(2006)和其他人用于无转移的环境的拉格朗日技术。该研究项目提出了一种解决机制设计问题的开创性方法,没有转移和昂贵的欺诈,突出了与最优运输理论文献的新联系。在经济学中,它扩展了主要的机制设计范式,允许代理人的私人信息具有“硬”(错误报告的代价)和“软”(错误报告的自由)维度。我们提供的设置和见解可以应用于基于联邦资金分配的评级系统的设计(例如,医疗补助提供者和养老院的评级系统)。它们也可以应用于会计和税收标准的设计。所有这些系统都经常受到游戏和操纵的困扰,使得我们基于昂贵的类型伪造的建模相关。该项目还对计算机科学产生了跨学科的影响。计算机科学理论与算法操作有关。考虑到这样的操作可能是昂贵的,并且算法的抽象建模类似于没有传输的机制,建模和解决方法可以应用于防操作算法的设计。该奖项反映了美国国家科学基金会的法定使命,并通过使用基金会的知识价值和更广泛的影响审查标准进行评估,被认为值得支持。

项目成果

期刊论文数量(0)
专著数量(0)
科研奖励数量(0)
会议论文数量(0)
专利数量(0)

数据更新时间:{{ journalArticles.updateTime }}

{{ item.title }}
{{ item.translation_title }}
  • DOI:
    {{ item.doi }}
  • 发表时间:
    {{ item.publish_year }}
  • 期刊:
  • 影响因子:
    {{ item.factor }}
  • 作者:
    {{ item.authors }}
  • 通讯作者:
    {{ item.author }}

数据更新时间:{{ journalArticles.updateTime }}

{{ item.title }}
  • 作者:
    {{ item.author }}

数据更新时间:{{ monograph.updateTime }}

{{ item.title }}
  • 作者:
    {{ item.author }}

数据更新时间:{{ sciAawards.updateTime }}

{{ item.title }}
  • 作者:
    {{ item.author }}

数据更新时间:{{ conferencePapers.updateTime }}

{{ item.title }}
  • 作者:
    {{ item.author }}

数据更新时间:{{ patent.updateTime }}

Vasiliki Skreta其他文献

The Role of Outside Options in Auction Design
外部选择在拍卖设计中的作用
  • DOI:
    10.2139/ssrn.1120968
  • 发表时间:
    2007
  • 期刊:
  • 影响因子:
    0
  • 作者:
    N. Figueroa;Vasiliki Skreta
  • 通讯作者:
    Vasiliki Skreta
Models, Inattention and Expectation Updates
模型、注意力不集中和期望更新
  • DOI:
  • 发表时间:
    2015
  • 期刊:
  • 影响因子:
    0
  • 作者:
    R. Giacomini;Vasiliki Skreta;Javier Turén
  • 通讯作者:
    Javier Turén
The role of optimal threats in auction design
最佳威胁在拍卖设计中的作用
  • DOI:
  • 发表时间:
    2009
  • 期刊:
  • 影响因子:
    0
  • 作者:
    N. Figueroa;Vasiliki Skreta
  • 通讯作者:
    Vasiliki Skreta
Optimal allocation mechanisms with single-dimensional private information
单维隐私信息的最优分配机制
  • DOI:
    10.1007/s10058-010-0107-6
  • 发表时间:
    2011
  • 期刊:
  • 影响因子:
    0.7
  • 作者:
    N. Figueroa;Vasiliki Skreta
  • 通讯作者:
    Vasiliki Skreta
Mechanism design with limited commitment: Markov environments
  • DOI:
    10.1016/j.euroecorev.2024.104777
  • 发表时间:
    2024-08-01
  • 期刊:
  • 影响因子:
  • 作者:
    Laura Doval;Vasiliki Skreta
  • 通讯作者:
    Vasiliki Skreta

Vasiliki Skreta的其他文献

{{ item.title }}
{{ item.translation_title }}
  • DOI:
    {{ item.doi }}
  • 发表时间:
    {{ item.publish_year }}
  • 期刊:
  • 影响因子:
    {{ item.factor }}
  • 作者:
    {{ item.authors }}
  • 通讯作者:
    {{ item.author }}

{{ truncateString('Vasiliki Skreta', 18)}}的其他基金

Collaborative Research: Sequentially Optimal Mechanism Design
协作研究:顺序优化机构设计
  • 批准号:
    1851729
  • 财政年份:
    2019
  • 资助金额:
    $ 27.97万
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant
Multi-Agent Mechanism Design under Non-Commitment
非承诺下的多Agent机制设计
  • 批准号:
    0451365
  • 财政年份:
    2004
  • 资助金额:
    $ 27.97万
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant

相似海外基金

Proof study on end of the policy mechanism in the education policy
教育政策中政策机制终结的实证研究
  • 批准号:
    19K02790
  • 财政年份:
    2019
  • 资助金额:
    $ 27.97万
  • 项目类别:
    Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
Study on mechanism of fire retardant agent elution and fire proof performance deterioration of fire retardant treated wood in sprinkling water and drying environment
喷水干燥环境下阻燃处理木材阻燃剂溶出及防火性能劣化机理研究
  • 批准号:
    19K15153
  • 财政年份:
    2019
  • 资助金额:
    $ 27.97万
  • 项目类别:
    Grant-in-Aid for Early-Career Scientists
Elucidation of mechanism for tritium accumulation to soil and proof of principle for new decontamination method
阐明土壤中氚积累的机制并证明新净化方法的原理
  • 批准号:
    19H01877
  • 财政年份:
    2019
  • 资助金额:
    $ 27.97万
  • 项目类别:
    Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (B)
Proof of effectiveness of exosomes for regeneration of temporomandibular joint disc and elucidation of regeneration mechanism
外泌体对颞下颌关节盘再生的有效性证明及再生机制的阐明
  • 批准号:
    18K17085
  • 财政年份:
    2018
  • 资助金额:
    $ 27.97万
  • 项目类别:
    Grant-in-Aid for Early-Career Scientists
Shape Optimization and Performance Evaluation of Vibration-proof Mechanism Using Origami-inspired Structures
使用折纸结构的防振机构的形状优化和性能评估
  • 批准号:
    17K18166
  • 财政年份:
    2017
  • 资助金额:
    $ 27.97万
  • 项目类别:
    Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
Secure implementation with extensive form mechanism
通过广泛的形式机制安全实施
  • 批准号:
    16K17087
  • 财政年份:
    2016
  • 资助金额:
    $ 27.97万
  • 项目类别:
    Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
Molecular analyses of crossing-proof mechanism of dendrites
树突防交叉机制的分子分析
  • 批准号:
    24500410
  • 财政年份:
    2012
  • 资助金额:
    $ 27.97万
  • 项目类别:
    Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
Electrostatically charged cement particles for electrostatic proof of chlorine corrosion and the analysis of its electrostatic charge mechanism
带静电防氯腐蚀水泥颗粒及其静电荷机理分析
  • 批准号:
    23656281
  • 财政年份:
    2011
  • 资助金额:
    $ 27.97万
  • 项目类别:
    Grant-in-Aid for Challenging Exploratory Research
Naltrexone implants in opioid dependence: a proof of mechanism study with pk and pd measures
纳曲酮植入治疗阿片类药物依赖:通过 pk 和 pd 测量进行机制研究的证明
  • 批准号:
    G0701665/1
  • 财政年份:
    2008
  • 资助金额:
    $ 27.97万
  • 项目类别:
    Research Grant
Proof of Mechanism Study for the Treatment of Social Anhedonia in ASD
自闭症谱系障碍社交快感缺乏治疗机制研究的证据
  • 批准号:
    10228041
  • 财政年份:
    2007
  • 资助金额:
    $ 27.97万
  • 项目类别:
{{ showInfoDetail.title }}

作者:{{ showInfoDetail.author }}

知道了