CT-ISG: Cryptographic Foundations for Next-Generation Security Applications

CT-ISG：下一代安全应用程序的加密基础Boaz Barak该项目解决了网络社会和普及数据库对密码学提出的一些基本挑战。具体来说，它研究了存在的密码协议，允许相互不信任的各方以最小的牺牲隐私来实现共同的目标。这包括作为一个特殊情况的协议，电子选举，电子拍卖，隐私保护数据挖掘和许多更多的应用。在这样的协议中的一个中心问题是在网络上执行一个或多个协议的多个实例的安全性的影响。众所周知，在某些情况下，这种相互作用可能导致微妙的，但致命的安全缺陷，因此，构造安全性相对于这种相互作用是鲁棒的协议是这种密码学中的中心问题。本项目利用最新的思想和技术来解决这个问题，具体地说，研究涉及信任和交互之间的权衡，有已知的协议具有鲁棒的安全性，假设存在完全可信的第三方。这个项目的重点是减少一个可信方的假设，并旨在发现在多大程度上可以做到这一点，而不损害安全。我们的目标是得到两个积极的结果-协议在较弱的信任假设下获得强大的安全性比以前已知的，和消极的结果-表明，某些安全目标是不可能实现的，没有一些信任假设。这将使安全应用程序的用户知道在信任和安全性方面什么是可实现的，什么是不可实现的。本项目还处理了当前鲁棒安全协议构造中效率低下的主要原因，以找出在多大程度上当前这种构造中的效率瓶颈是固有的。

CT-ISG: Cryptographic Foundations for Next-Generation SecurityApplicationsBoaz BarakThis project tackles some of the foundational challenges to theadvent of the networked society and pervasive databases pose tocryptography. Specifically, it studies the existence ofcryptographic protocols that allow mutually distrusting parties toachieve a common goal with a minimal sacrifice in privacy. Thisincludes as a special case protocols for electronic elections, electronicauctions, privacy-preserving data mining and many more applications.A central issue in such protocols is the effect on security of executingmultiples instances of one or several protocols over a network.It is known that in some cases such interaction can lead to subtlebut fatal security flaws, and so constructing protocols whose securityis robust with respect to such interactionsis a central question in this cryptography. This project usesrecent and new ideas and techniques to attack this problem.More concretely, the research involvesstudying the tradeoff between trust and interaction.There are known protocols with robust security assuming the existenceof completely trusted third parties. This project focuses on reducing theassumption of a trusted party, and aims to discover to what extentthis can be done without compromising security. The goal is to get bothpositive results- protocols obtaining robust security under weaker trustassumptions than was previously known, and negative results- showingthat certain security goals are impossible to achieve without sometrust assumptions. This will allow the users of secure applicationsto know what is and is not achievable in terms of trust and security.This project also tackles the main sources of inefficiency in currentconstructions of robustly secure protocol, in order to find out to what extentthe current efficiency bottlenecks in such constructions are inherent.