Doctoral Dissertation Research: Norm Conformity and Social Identity in Collective Action Groups

职务名称：集体行动群体中的规范一致性和社会认同感PI：布伦特辛普森，南卡罗来纳大学提案编号：0703402摘要集体行动问题出现时，个人必须选择自己的自我利益，一个群体或社会作为一个整体的利益。追求自身利益是诱人的，但可能对群体的总体福利产生有害影响。例如，一个人可能会受到诱惑而逃避纳税。但如果所有人都这么做，政府就会垮台。其他的集体行动问题包括在自愿选举中投票，支持公共电视和乱扔垃圾。如果没有协调一致的努力，这些集体努力肯定会失败。社会认同已被证明对集体行动有重要影响。当潜在的贡献者认同其他群体成员时，他们对集体行动的贡献更大。这种积极的关系之所以存在，是因为当人们认识到他们拥有共同的群体身份时，个人和集体的利益变得更加紧密。但是，是什么导致了某些群体内部的高度社会认同，而不是其他群体？我们的桥梁社会学和社会心理学文献表明，规范一致性导致社会认同。当个体符合感知规范时，他们会感觉与其他符合者相似。反过来，感知到的相似性是社会认同出现的必要和充分前提。我们比较预测，从我们的规范帐户的社会认同和团结集体行动团体的典型的理性选择的方法，以团体团结。理性选择方法通常假设认同和团结是基于通过群体成员资格积累的利益。与此相反，这里发展和测试的论点表明，身份（和团结）的水平是视情况而定的“适当”的行为，规定的组（即符合组规范）。为了区分这些对立的观点，并检验我们的基本论点，我们提出了一个新的实验。参与者将获得一笔捐赠资金，并必须决定他们希望为一个有利于整个团体的基金贡献多少（如果有的话）。在他们的贡献之前，参与者将得到关于表面上的小组成员的贡献的反馈。在“规范”条件下，其他人的表面贡献只有微小的差异。在“无规范”的条件下，他人的贡献差异很大。虽然方差差异很大，但平均贡献在这些条件下保持不变，因此等同于通过群体成员资格获得的利益。这使我们能够研究群体规范对社会认同的影响。集体行动问题在社会生活中普遍存在，并产生重要的社会后果。因此，必须了解如何开展合作，以促进成功的集体行动。本研究特别关注如何解决这些问题的新论点。我们通过这项工作所获得的理解应该适用于集体行动受到威胁的许多情况。这项研究的结果将通过学术期刊、专业报告以及适当的其他媒体传播。这种出版物和介绍应有助于增进对社会学基本理论的实验性检验的理解和赞赏，并有助于说明关于集体行动的基本研究对广泛的现实世界案例的适用性。

Title: Norm Conformity and Social Identity in Collective Action GroupsPI: Brent Simpson, University of South CarolinaProposal Number: 0703402AbstractCollective action problems arise when individuals must choose between their own self-interest, and the interests of a group or society as a whole. Pursuit of self-interest is tempting, but can have deleterious effects on the group's total welfare. For example, an individual may be tempted to avoid paying his or her taxes. Yet if all did so, government would collapse. Other collective action problems include voting in voluntary elections, supporting public television, and littering. Without concerted effort, these collective endeavors would certainly fail. Social identity has been shown to have important consequences for collective action. When potential contributors identify with other group members, they contribute more to collective action. This positive relationship exists because individual and collective interests become more closely aligned when people recognize that they share a common group identity. But what leads to high levels of social identification within certain groups but not others? We bridge sociological and social psychological literatures to suggest that norm conformity leads to social identification. When individuals conform to perceived norms, they feel similar to other conformers. Perceived similarity, in turn, is a necessary and sufficient prerequisite for the emergence of social identification. We compare predictions from our normative account of social identification and solidarity in collective action groups to the typical rational choice approach to group solidarity. Rational choice approaches generally assume that identification and solidarity are based on the benefits accrued through group membership. In contrast, the argument developed and tested here suggests that the level of identification (and solidarity) is contingent upon "proper" behavior as prescribed by the group (i.e. conformity to group norms). To tease apart these competing views, and to test our basic argument, we propose a new experiment. Participants will be given a monetary endowment, and must decide how much (if any) of that endowment they wish to contribute toward a fund that benefits the group as a whole. Prior to their contribution, participants will be given feedback about the contributions of ostensible group members. In a "norm" condition, others' ostensible contributions vary only slightly. In a "no norm" condition, others' contributions vary a great deal. While the variance differs considerably, mean contributions are held constant across these conditions, thus equating benefits gained through group membership. This allows us to investigate the impact of group norms on social identification. Collective action problems are ubiquitous in social life, and have important social consequences. Thus understanding how to generate cooperation in order to foster successful collective actions is imperative. This research focuses specifically on a new argument about how to solve such problems. The understanding we acquire through this work should be applicable to a host of situations where collective action is threatened. The results of this research will be disseminated through academic journals, professional presentations, and, where appropriate, other media. Such publication and presentation should help to increase understanding and appreciation for experimentally testing basic theories in sociology, and for illustrating the applicability of basic research on collective action to a wide range of real-world cases.