CT-ISG: Robust and Efficient Tamper-Resistant Software

社会越来越依赖软件系统来提供重要服务。因此，保护该软件免受未经授权的修改至关重要。例如，恶意用户可能修改或篡改二进制文件以规避保护或许可机制，或者引入可在以后被利用的漏洞。以往基于软件的防篡改和混淆研究试图提供解决方案，但未能在现实的威胁模型下提供足够的保护，未能提供实用的解决方案，或未能提供针对攻击者使用复杂的静态和动态分析的攻击的保护。本项目旨在解决当前基于软件的防篡改和混淆技术的缺点。所采取的方法是将创新的、超高效的软件动态翻译技术与理论上合理的加密技术以及静态防篡改和混淆技术的动态版本相结合。该项目的基本贡献包括：动态生成和插入不透明谓词到运行代码中的有效方法，新的动态技术程序混淆，一种新的方法，自我校验和，这是比以前提出的技术更强，和新的度量评估和测量防篡改技术的强度。恶意攻击者继续在关键软件基础设施中发现安全漏洞并组织攻击。这项研究寻求一种补充性的二级防御，使恶意实体更难分析软件以定位漏洞，然后使用这些信息来开发攻击。预期结果的适用性是非常广泛的，因为结果可以用于使各种各样的软件（用户软件以及服务器软件）防篡改。

Increasingly, society relies on software systems to provide vital services. Consequently, it is critically important that this software be protected from unauthorized modification. For example, a malicious user may modify or tamper with a binary to circumvent protection or license mechanisms or introduce vulnerabilities that can be later exploited. Previous software-based anti-tamper and obfuscation research has attempted to provide solutions, but has failed to provide adequate protection under a realistic threat model, has failed to provide practical solutions, or has failed to provide protection against attacks in which an adversary uses sophisticated static and dynamic analyses.This project seeks to address the shortcomings of current software-based technology for tamper-resistance and obfuscation. The approach taken is to meld innovative, ultra-efficient software dynamic translation technology with theoretically sound encryption technology and dynamic versions of static anti-tampering and obfuscation techniques. The fundamental contributions expected from this project include: efficient methods for dynamically generating and inserting opaque predicates into running code, new dynamic techniques for program obfuscation, a new approach to self-checksumming that is stronger than previously proposed techniques, and new metrics for evaluating and measuring the strength of tamper-resistance techniques.The consequences of this research also include several societal impacts. Malicious adversaries continue to find security flaws in and marshal attacks against critical software infrastructures. This research pursues a complementary, secondary defense by making it harder for malicious entities to analyze software to locate vulnerabilities and then use this information to develop attacks. The applicability of the results is expected to be very broad since the results can be used to make a wide variety of software (both user software as well as server software) tamper-resistant.