Doctoral Dissertation Research in Political Science/Law and Social Science: Neglected Portions of Separation of Powers Interactions

【摘要】本研究项目评估两个研究问题。首先，在什么情况下，国会会因为最高法院的负面对待而改变其立法决定？第二，国会是否能够有效地撤销最高法院的指令？在三权分立（SOP）传统中，绝大多数实证工作要么集中在最高法院行使审查的决定上，要么集中在国会对最高法院裁决作出回应的决定上。我把对战略行为的考虑延伸到国会制定立法的最初决定，以及通过相应立法的后果。为了评估对国会的司法约束假设，我将收集1970年至2002年期间在众议院和参议院司法委员会批准听证会的所有法案的数据，以及1954年至1995年期间在任何委员会批准听证会的所有法案的数据，这些法案包含了推翻、修改或澄清1954年至1995年期间最高法院的宪法决定的条款。我将评估最高法院的意识形态对制定这些拟议法案的决定的影响。为了评估国会废除最高法院裁决的能力，我将考虑1954年至2005年期间为回应最高法院的宪法裁决而通过的立法的实质和后果。除了将收集的大量新数据外，论文项目将在方法论上做出贡献，这将对国会和权力分立的其他学者有价值。方法上的创新包括一种新的国会议程衡量方法，该方法基于委员会批准的法案和听证会，以及学者们可以使用的可获取的方法，以在单一的政策空间中定位政策结果。该项目的更广泛影响包括增进对国会和法院之间关系的理解，这对研究部门间关系的学者和美国公众都有影响。该项目涉及法律学者和政治科学家感兴趣的理论和经验问题，但也有助于更实际地评估国会和法院对政策结果的相对影响，并分析法院在美国政治中作为反多数主义力量的程度。

Primary Investigators: Bethany Blackstone and Micheal W. GilesThe Neglected Portions of Separation of Powers Interactions0719945AbstractThis research project assesses two research questions. First, under what conditions does Congress alter its decision to enact legislation because of negative treatment by the Supreme Court? Second, is Congress able to effectively countermand the directives of the Supreme Court? The overwhelming majority of empirical work in the separation of powers (SOP) tradition focuses on either the decision of the Supreme Court to exercise review or the decision of Congress to respond to Supreme Court decisions. I extend the consideration of strategic behavior backwards to the initial decision of Congress to enact legislation and forward to the aftermath of passage of responsive legislation. To assess the hypothesis of a judicial constraint on Congress, I will collect data on all bills granted hearings in the House and Senate Judiciary Committees between 1970 and 2002 and on all bills granted hearings in any committee between 1954 and 1995 that contain provisions that would overrule, modify, or clarify constitutional decisions of the Supreme Court between 1954 and 1995. I will assess the effect of Supreme Court ideology on the decision to enact these proposed bills. To evaluate the ability of Congress to nullify the decisions of the Supreme Court, I will consider the substance and aftermath of legislation passed in response to the Supreme Court's constitutional decisions between 1954 and 2005. In addition to the significant amounts of new data that will be collected, the dissertation project will make methodological contributions that will be of value to other scholars of Congress and the separation of powers. Methodological innovations include a new measure of the congressional agenda that is based on bills granted hearings in committees and accessible methods scholars can employ to locate policy outcomes in a unidimensional policy space.The broader impacts of the project include the advancement of understanding of the relationship between Congress and the Court that has implications for scholars of interbranch relations and the American public. The project addresses theoretical and empirical issues of interest to legal academics and political scientists but also contributes to the more practical evaluation of the relative influence of Congress and the Court on policy outcomes and analysis of the extent to which the Court acts as a countermajoritarian force in American politics.