Collaborative Research: Public Commitment in International Relations

十多年来，许多国际关系学者一直热衷于超越新现实主义将国家视为单一行为体的处理，并理解国内政治因素对国际关系的影响。这方面的一个主要趋势是“两级博弈"，研究对行政部门的外部国内限制如何影响国际谈判，例如许多国家要求主要国际协定需要立法批准。这方面的另一个主要活动是探讨领导人如何在国内听众面前发表公开声明（“听众成本”），以更好地传达在危机谈判中的决心。 在这个项目中，研究人员以这两个文献为出发点，并进行了广泛的理论研究，领导人如何使用在国内观众面前的公开声明，以影响他们在和平谈判以及危机谈判中的谈判地位。研究人员已经分析了一个博弈论模型，以探索领导者如何利用公共承诺在国际谈判中产生讨价还价的杠杆。在这项研究中，调查人员构建和分析了一系列额外的博弈论模型，以探讨：o如何不完整的信息，对方的观众成本影响国际谈判。受众成本如何与诸如立法批准国际协定等外部国内制约因素相互作用，从而影响国际谈判。·受众成本如何在危机谈判中为可分商品提供谈判杠杆，以及在这种情况下，受众成本的共同使用如何导致次优结果，甚至可能导致战争。受众成本如何既可用于讨价还价的杠杆，也可用于在不完全信息危机中就可分商品讨价还价时合理地传达解决方案。智力优势：该项目将在研究国内政治因素对国际互动的影响的研究议程方面取得重大科学进展。它将加强我们对公共承诺在和平时期国际谈判、危机谈判中所起作用的理解，并加深对战争的理性主义基础和民主和平背后的因果机制的理解。这些都是国际关系理论的重要发展，有助于弥合国际关系与比较政治学之间的差距。更广泛的影响：由于该项目所研究的问题，即在国际交往中使用私人与公共声明，是直接在领导人的控制下，该项目具有潜在的重要政策影响。这项研究将通过一系列期刊文章向更广泛的研究界展示，并将在课堂，研讨会和学术会议上展示。最后，由于战争和民主和平是根本性的重要社会问题，理解它们的原因具有重大的社会意义。

For well over a decade now, many scholars in international relations have been intensely interested in moving beyond neorealism's treatment of the state as a unitary actor and understanding the impact of domestic political factors on international relations. One major trend in this regard has been work on "two-level games that looks at how exogenous domestic constraints on the executive, such as the requirement in many countries that major international agreements require legislative ratification, affect international negotiations. Another major movement in this regard has been work exploring how leaders can make public statements in front of their domestic audiences ("audience costs") to more credibly convey resolve in crisis bargaining. In this project, the investigators take these two literatures as their point of departure and conduct a broad theoretical examination of how leaders can use public statements in front of their domestic audiences to affect their bargaining position in peacetime negotiations as well as crisis bargaining. The investigators have already analyzed a game-theoretic model to explore how leaders can use public commitments to generate bargaining leverage in international negotiations. In this study the investigators construct and analyze a series of additional game-theoretic models to explore: o How incomplete information about the other side's audience costs affect international negotiations. o How audience costs can interact with exogenous domestic constraints such as legislative ratification of international agreements to affect international negotiations. o How audience costs can provide bargaining leverage in crisis bargaining over a divisible good, and how the mutual use of audience costs in this setting can lead to suboptimal outcomes, perhaps even war. o How audience costs can be used for both bargaining leverage as well as to credibly convey resolve in incomplete information crisis bargaining over a divisible good. Intellectual Merit: This project will make significant scientific advances in the research agenda that looks at the impact of domestic political factors on international interactions. It will enhance our understanding of the role that public commitments play on peacetime international negotiations, crisis bargaining, as well as lead to a deeper understanding of the rationalist foundations for war and the causal mechanisms behind the democratic peace. These are all significant developments in international relations theory, and help bridge the gap between the subfields of international relations and comparative politics.Broader Impact: Because the issue that the project examines, the use of private versus public statements in international interactions, is directly under the control of leaders, the project has potentially important policy implications. This research will be presented to the broader research community through a series of journal articles, and will also be presented in classrooms, seminars, and academic conferences. Finally, because war and the democratic peace are fundamentally important social issues, understanding their causes is of great social importance.