Collaborative Research: Public Commitment in International Relations

十多年来，许多国际关系学者一直热衷于超越新现实主义将国家视为单一行为者的观点，并理解国内政治因素对国际关系的影响。这方面的一个主要趋势是开展“两级博弈”，考察对行政机关的外部国内制约，例如许多国家要求重大国际协定必须获得立法批准，如何影响国际谈判。这方面的另一项重大行动是探索领导人如何在国内观众面前发表公开声明(“观众成本”)，以更可信地传达危机谈判的决心。在这个项目中，调查人员以这两篇文献为出发点，对领导人如何在国内观众面前使用公开声明来影响他们在和平时期谈判和危机谈判中的谈判地位进行了广泛的理论考察。调查人员已经分析了一个博弈论模型，以探索领导人如何利用公开承诺在国际谈判中产生讨价还价的筹码。在这项研究中，研究者构建并分析了一系列额外的博弈论模型，以探索：o关于对方观众成本的不完全信息如何影响国际谈判。O观众成本如何与影响国际谈判的国际协定的立法批准等外部国内制约因素相互作用。O观众成本如何在危机中为可分割的商品讨价还价提供筹码，以及在这种情况下观众成本的共同使用如何导致次优结果，甚至可能是战争。O如何利用观众成本既作为讨价还价的筹码，又在不完全信息危机中可信地传达决心，就可分割的商品进行讨价还价。学术价值：这个项目将在研究国内政治因素对国际互动的影响的研究议程上取得重大的科学进展。它将增进我们对公共承诺在和平时期国际谈判和危机谈判中发挥的作用的理解，并使我们更深刻地理解战争的理性主义基础和民主和平背后的因果机制。这些都是国际关系理论的重大发展，有助于弥合国际关系和比较政治这两个子领域之间的差距。广泛影响：由于该项目审查的问题，即在国际互动中使用私下和公开声明，直接由领导人控制，因此该项目具有潜在的重要政策影响。这项研究将通过一系列期刊文章向更广泛的研究社区展示，也将在课堂、研讨会和学术会议上展示。最后，由于战争与民主和平是根本上的重大社会问题，了解其原因具有重要的社会意义。

For well over a decade now, many scholars in international relations have been intensely interested in moving beyond neorealism's treatment of the state as a unitary actor and understanding the impact of domestic political factors on international relations. One major trend in this regard has been work on "two-level games that looks at how exogenous domestic constraints on the executive, such as the requirement in many countries that major international agreements require legislative ratification, affect international negotiations. Another major movement in this regard has been work exploring how leaders can make public statements in front of their domestic audiences ("audience costs") to more credibly convey resolve in crisis bargaining. In this project, the investigators take these two literatures as their point of departure and conduct a broad theoretical examination of how leaders can use public statements in front of their domestic audiences to affect their bargaining position in peacetime negotiations as well as crisis bargaining. The investigators have already analyzed a game-theoretic model to explore how leaders can use public commitments to generate bargaining leverage in international negotiations. In this study the investigators construct and analyze a series of additional game-theoretic models to explore: o How incomplete information about the other side's audience costs affect international negotiations. o How audience costs can interact with exogenous domestic constraints such as legislative ratification of international agreements to affect international negotiations. o How audience costs can provide bargaining leverage in crisis bargaining over a divisible good, and how the mutual use of audience costs in this setting can lead to suboptimal outcomes, perhaps even war. o How audience costs can be used for both bargaining leverage as well as to credibly convey resolve in incomplete information crisis bargaining over a divisible good. Intellectual Merit: This project will make significant scientific advances in the research agenda that looks at the impact of domestic political factors on international interactions. It will enhance our understanding of the role that public commitments play on peacetime international negotiations, crisis bargaining, as well as lead to a deeper understanding of the rationalist foundations for war and the causal mechanisms behind the democratic peace. These are all significant developments in international relations theory, and help bridge the gap between the subfields of international relations and comparative politics.Broader Impact: Because the issue that the project examines, the use of private versus public statements in international interactions, is directly under the control of leaders, the project has potentially important policy implications. This research will be presented to the broader research community through a series of journal articles, and will also be presented in classrooms, seminars, and academic conferences. Finally, because war and the democratic peace are fundamentally important social issues, understanding their causes is of great social importance.