Collaborative Research on How Nominators Affect Government Formation
Collaborative Research on How Nominators Affect Government Formation
批准号:
0749517
负责人:
Royce Carroll
金额:
$11.79万
依托单位国家:
美国
项目类别:
Standard Grant
财政年份:
2008
资助国家:
美国
项目状态:
已结题
起止时间:
2008-04-15 至 2011-03-31
中文摘要
在议会制和半总统制政体中,总理在组建和协调政府方面发挥着核心作用。因此,组织英超竞争的规则非常重要。尽管以下描述并不同样适用于所有情况,但考虑到总理选举后的三个阶段是有帮助的:(1)提名阶段,在这个阶段,宪法规定的行为者——我们一般称之为“提名者”——选择一个政府的缔造者,通常是推定的总理;(2)谈判阶段,组阁方试图组阁;(3)批准阶段,在这个阶段,议会要么明确批准提议的总理和政府(通过授权投票),要么暗中接受他或她的政府(通过不信任投票失败)。关于第二阶段(谈判),我们注意到被任命为格式化者的两个优势:首先,格式化者通常会成为总理;其次,组阁者可以为他的政党争取额外的内阁职位(参见Baron and Ferejohn 1989)。作为成为总理和/或获得其他理想组合的中间步骤,成为格式化者的重要性意味着提名者的选择(在第一阶段)很重要。“提名人”通常是君主或总统。无论他们的正式立场如何,候选人在两个关键方面存在差异:(a)他们的党派偏好有多明确;(二)宪法规则和规范如何限制他们的选择(谁将成为领导人)。PIs计划收集1990年至今所有议会制和半总统制民主国家整个政府组建过程的数据。这些数据包括但不限于:(1)提名者的党派关系;(2)提名人面临的宪法约束;(3)提名者面临的政治机会(主要取决于政党和联盟制度的分裂);(四)第一、第二、第三等指定的办事员;(5)在各党派之间分配内阁职务和其他职务(如委员会主席);(六)政党关于联合组阁意向的公告。接下来将分析(1)候选人是否更有可能任命本党成员担任组阁人;(2)提名者能否确保其政党在内阁职位中获得额外份额;(3)何时以及为什么格式制定者能够获得内阁组合的额外份额;(4)对提名者效应的预期如何影响选前联盟的形成和/或合并以形成更大的政党。该项目的学术价值在于,它澄清了议会制和半总统制政府组建的议价过程,特别是强调了党派候选人的作用。该项目的更广泛影响包括为政治改革者的决策提供一些基础,这些改革者最近在许多国家主要关注的是重新设计政府组建过程或政党制度。
英文摘要
In parliamentary and semi-presidential regimes, prime ministers play a central role in forming and coordinating governments. The rules that structure competition for the premiership are thus of great importance. Although the following characterization does not fit all cases equally well, it is helpful to think of there being three post-electoral stages in the election of a premier: (1) a nomination stage, in which a constitutionally stipulated actor-whom we shall generically call the "nominator"-chooses a government formateur, typically the presumptive prime minister; (2) a negotiation stage, in which the formateur attempts to form a government; and (3) a ratification stage, in which the assembly either explicitly approves the proposed premier and government (via an investiture vote) or implicitly accepts his or her government (via the failure to pass a no-confidence vote). Regarding the second (negotiation) stage, we note two advantages of being appointed as formateur: first, the formateur typically becomes the prime minister; second, the formateur may secure a bonus for his party, in the form of additional cabinet portfolios (cf. Baron and Ferejohn 1989). The importance of becoming formateur, as an intermediate step to becoming premier and/or securing other desirable portfolios, means that the nominator's choice (in the first stage) is important.The "nominator" is usually a monarch or a president. Whatever their formal positions, nominators differ along two key dimensions: (a) how clear their partisan preferences are; and (b) how constrained their choice (of who will be formateur) is by constitutional rules and norms. The PIs intend to collect data on the entire government formation process in all parliamentary and semi-presidential democracies from 1990-present. The data include but are not limited to: (1) the partisan affiliation of the nominator; (2) the constitutional constraints the nominator faces; (3) the political opportunities the nominator faces (largely determined by the fragmentation of the party and alliance system); (4) the first appointed formateur, second, third, and so on; (5) the allocation of cabinet portfolios and other offices (e.g., committee chairs) among the various parties; (6) any public announcements made by parties regarding their coalitional intentions in forming a government. Analysis will then proceed of (1) whether nominators are more likely appoint members of their own party as formateur; (2) whether nominators can secure for their parties a bonus share of cabinet portfolios; (3) when and why formateurs are able to secure a bonus share of cabinet portfolios; and (4) how anticipation of nominator effects influences the formation of pre-election alliances and/or mergers to form larger parties.The intellectual merit of the project lies in its clarification of the bargaining process that structures government formation in parliamentary and semi-presidential regimes, especially highlighting the role of partisan nominators. The broader impact of the project include providing some basis for decisions by political reformers, who in many countries recently have been centrally concerned with re-engineering the government formation process or the party system.
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