SGER: Cryptographic Techniques for Trustworthy Computation in Faulty and Non-Confining Execution Environments

提案编号：0808907PI：Ronald L Riest机构：麻省理工学院标题：SGER：在有故障和非受限的执行环境中进行可信计算的加密技术这项探索性研究的目标是找到在不安全、不完美和可能的恶意环境中进行安全计算的方法。为了实现这一目标，正在采取两种相辅相成的办法。第一种是受携带代码证明技术的启发，？是携带证据的数据吗？一个框架，可以解决当前方法的许多困难。在这个框架中，系统设计人员规定了计算的所需属性--S输出，通常表示安全或隐私属性。这些性质的证明附在流经系统的数据上，并由系统的S组件相互验证。第二个研究重点是研究在不可避免的风险下，计算的具体实现如何保证安全属性的方法。该方法的新奇之处在于，风险所基于的假设是可列举的，因此可以对它们进行检查，以确保它们在理想情况下是最小的、现实的和可验证的。

Proposal Number: 0808907PI: Ronald L RivestInstitution: Massachusetts Institute of TechnologyTitle: SGER: Cryptographic Techniques for Trustworthy Computation in Faulty and Non-Confining Execution EnvironmentsThe objective of this exploratory research is to find methods for conducting secure computation within insecure, imperfect, and possibly malicious environments. To realize this goal, two complementary approaches are being pursued. The first one, inspired by the technique of ?proof carrying code,? is a ?Proof-Carrying Data? framework that can address many of the difficulties with current approaches. In this framework, the system designer prescribe the desired properties of the computation?s output, usually expressing a security or privacy property. Proofs of these properties are attached to the data flowing through the system, and are mutually verified by the system?s components. The second research focus is the investigation of means by which concrete realizations of computation can guarantee security properties despite inevitable risks. The novelty in the method is that the assumptions on which the risks are based are enumeratable, so they can be checked to be sure they that are, ideally, minimal, realistic, and verifiable.