Doctoral Dissertation Research: "Economizing Attention: Agendas and the Influence of Bureaucracy in American Policymaking"

博士论文研究：“节约注意力：美国政策制定中的议程和官僚主义的影响”

• 批准号: 0819429
• 负责人: Bryan Jones
• 金额: --
• 依托单位: University of Texas at Austin
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2008
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2008-09-15 至 2010-08-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0819429&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Doctoral; Dissertation; Research; Economizing; Attention

This project examines the role of the federal bureaucracy as the "antennae" of government. The bureaucracy compensates for the attention limits of the elected branches of government in sending them signals about important policy problems. The research addresses two primary questions: 1. What effect does bureaucratic signaling about policy problems have on the policy agendas of Congress and the President? 2. How does attention and authoritative political decisions affect the content and dynamics of signaling by the federal bureaucracy? A theory of bureaucratic influence is developed that relates scarcity of attention and institutional organization to the content and dynamics of policy agendas. Using time series techniques, the substance and volatility of policy agendas in and between the federal bureaucracy and elected branches of government are examined. The theorizing in this project developed a new framework and a unique set of research questions that pave the way for new avenues of inquiry that moves beyond the state of current theorizing on the role of bureaucracy in democratic governance. The research design generates a unique set of data related to agenda setting in federal agencies since the Second World War. These data sets will benefit scholars studying bureaucracies as well as those working in related subfields such as presidential administration and congressional policymaking.

这个项目考察了作为政府“触角”的联邦官僚机构的作用。官僚机构弥补了民选政府部门在重要政策问题上的注意力不足。该研究解决了两个主要问题：1。关于政策问题的官僚信号对国会和总统的政策议程有什么影响？2.注意力和权威性的政治决策如何影响联邦官僚机构发出信号的内容和动态？官僚影响力的理论，涉及稀缺的关注和制度组织的内容和动态的政策议程。使用时间序列技术，政策议程的实质和波动性之间的联邦官僚机构和民选政府部门进行检查。该项目的理论化开发了一个新的框架和一套独特的研究问题，为超越当前关于官僚机构在民主治理中的作用的理论化状态的新的调查途径铺平了道路。研究设计产生了一套独特的数据，有关议程设置的联邦机构自第二次世界大战以来。这些数据集将使研究官僚机构的学者以及那些在总统行政和国会决策等相关子领域工作的学者受益。