Evolution of Norms and Conservation Rules in Two Fisheries

两种渔业规范和保护规则的演变

• 批准号: 0821968
• 负责人: James Acheson
• 金额: $ 16.01万
• 依托单位: University of Maine
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Continuing Grant
• 财政年份: 2008
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2008-09-01 至 2011-08-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0821968&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Evolution; Norms; Conservation; Rules; Two

Dr. James M. Acheson and Dr. Ann Acheson will undertake research on the processes by which rules to regulate natural resources come into being and the reasons they are followed or ignored. Most renewable natural resources are in a state of decline, including fisheries, grasslands, and forests. One reason is that rules and laws to conserve natural resources often fail to work well. This team of researchers will seek to understand the underlying reasons by studying two fisheries in the Gulf of Maine: the lobster industry, where effective rules have been developed and catches are at record highs, and the groundfish industry (which includes such fish as cod and haddock) where catches are at historic low levels and management appears to be ineffective. To study how these two management systems evolved, the project has four related components: (1) a study of the current culture and social organization of these two industries; (2) a historical study designed to understand how a conservation ethic arose in the lobster industry, while groundfishermen are just now beginning to try to conserve; (3) controlled laboratory experimental games done with Maine fishermen to explore when people will constrain their own exploitive efforts; (4) an evolutionary game theory model to integrate findings from the other parts of the project. The project will be carried out by an interdisciplinary team of anthropologists with extensive knowledge of Maine fisheries and fisheries policy, and economists with expertise in game theory. This project seeks to answer two important questions. First, how do norms and rules come into being? Second, what are the factors leading people to conserve or overexploit resources? This research has theoretical importance for social scientists seeking to understand the origins and persistence of social rules and institutions. The research findings also will have practical implications for resource managers, legislators, and policy makers.

James M.艾奇逊和安·艾奇逊博士将研究自然资源管理规则的形成过程，以及这些规则被遵守或被忽视的原因。大多数可再生自然资源都处于衰退状态，包括渔业、草原和森林。原因之一是保护自然资源的规则和法律往往不能很好地发挥作用。这组研究人员将通过研究缅因州海湾的两个渔业来寻求理解根本原因：龙虾业，有效的规则已经制定，渔获量达到创纪录的高水平，而底层鱼业（包括鳕鱼和黑线鳕等鱼类）的渔获量处于历史最低水平，管理似乎无效。为了研究这两个管理系统是如何演变的，该项目有四个相关的组成部分：（1）对这两个行业的当前文化和社会组织的研究;（2）历史研究，旨在了解保护伦理如何在龙虾行业中产生，而底层渔民刚刚开始尝试保护;（3）与缅因州渔民进行的受控实验室实验游戏，以探索人们何时会限制自己的剥削努力;（4）一个进化博弈论模型，以整合项目其他部分的发现。该项目将由一个跨学科的人类学家小组进行，该小组具有缅因州渔业和渔业政策的广泛知识，并具有博弈论专门知识的经济学家。这个项目试图回答两个重要问题。第一，规范和规则是如何形成的？第二，是什么因素导致人们保护或过度开发资源？这项研究对于社会科学家寻求理解社会规则和制度的起源和持久性具有理论意义。研究结果也将对资源管理者、立法者和政策制定者产生实际影响。