Evolution of Norms and Conservation Rules in Two Fisheries

詹姆斯·m·艾奇逊博士和安·艾奇逊博士将对管理自然资源的规则形成的过程以及遵守或忽视这些规则的原因进行研究。大多数可再生自然资源都处于减少状态，包括渔业、草原和森林。原因之一是保护自然资源的法规和法律往往不能很好地发挥作用。这组研究人员将通过研究缅因湾的两种渔业来寻求了解潜在的原因：龙虾业，在那里已经制定了有效的规则，捕获量创历史新高；底底鱼业（包括鳕鱼和黑线鳕等鱼），捕获量处于历史低位，管理似乎无效。为了研究这两种管理体系是如何演变的，该项目有四个相关组成部分：(1)研究这两个行业当前的文化和社会组织；(2)一项历史研究，旨在了解保护龙虾产业的伦理是如何产生的，而海底渔民现在才刚刚开始尝试保护龙虾；(3)以缅因渔民为研究对象，通过控制性实验游戏探索人们在什么时候会约束自己的开发努力；(4)一个进化博弈论模型来整合项目其他部分的发现。该项目将由一个跨学科小组执行，该小组由对缅因州渔业和渔业政策有广泛了解的人类学家和具有博弈论专长的经济学家组成。这个项目试图回答两个重要的问题。首先，规范和规则是如何产生的？第二，是什么因素导致人们保护或过度开发资源？这项研究对于寻求理解社会规则和制度的起源和持久性的社会科学家具有理论意义。研究结果还将对资源管理者、立法者和政策制定者产生实际影响。

Dr. James M. Acheson and Dr. Ann Acheson will undertake research on the processes by which rules to regulate natural resources come into being and the reasons they are followed or ignored. Most renewable natural resources are in a state of decline, including fisheries, grasslands, and forests. One reason is that rules and laws to conserve natural resources often fail to work well. This team of researchers will seek to understand the underlying reasons by studying two fisheries in the Gulf of Maine: the lobster industry, where effective rules have been developed and catches are at record highs, and the groundfish industry (which includes such fish as cod and haddock) where catches are at historic low levels and management appears to be ineffective. To study how these two management systems evolved, the project has four related components: (1) a study of the current culture and social organization of these two industries; (2) a historical study designed to understand how a conservation ethic arose in the lobster industry, while groundfishermen are just now beginning to try to conserve; (3) controlled laboratory experimental games done with Maine fishermen to explore when people will constrain their own exploitive efforts; (4) an evolutionary game theory model to integrate findings from the other parts of the project. The project will be carried out by an interdisciplinary team of anthropologists with extensive knowledge of Maine fisheries and fisheries policy, and economists with expertise in game theory. This project seeks to answer two important questions. First, how do norms and rules come into being? Second, what are the factors leading people to conserve or overexploit resources? This research has theoretical importance for social scientists seeking to understand the origins and persistence of social rules and institutions. The research findings also will have practical implications for resource managers, legislators, and policy makers.