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Evolution of Norms and Conservation Rules in Two Fisheries

Evolution of Norms and Conservation Rules in Two Fisheries
两种渔业规范和保护规则的演变
批准号:
0821968
负责人:
James Acheson
金额:
$16.01万
依托单位:
依托单位国家:
美国
项目类别:
Continuing Grant
财政年份:
2008
资助国家:
美国
项目状态:
已结题
起止时间:
2008-09-01 至 2011-08-31

项目摘要

项目成果

James Acheson的其他基金

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中文摘要
翻译
詹姆斯·M·艾奇逊博士和安·艾奇逊博士将对监管自然资源的规则形成的过程以及遵循或忽视这些规则的原因进行研究。包括渔业、草原和森林在内的大多数可再生自然资源都处于衰退状态。其中一个原因是,保护自然资源的规则和法律往往无法很好地发挥作用。这组研究人员将通过研究缅因湾的两个渔业来试图了解根本原因:龙虾行业,已经制定了有效的规则,渔获量创历史新高;底层鱼行业(包括鳕鱼和黑线鳕等鱼),渔获量处于历史低位,管理似乎无效。为了研究这两个管理系统是如何演变的,该项目有四个相关的部分:(1)对这两个行业当前文化和社会组织的研究;(2)旨在了解龙虾行业如何出现保护伦理的历史研究,而底层渔民刚刚开始尝试进行保护;(3)与缅因州渔民一起进行的受控实验室实验游戏,以探索人们何时会限制他们自己的开发努力;(4)进化博弈论模型,以整合项目其他部分的研究结果。该项目将由一个对缅因州渔业和渔业政策有广泛了解的人类学家和具有博弈论专业知识的经济学家组成的跨学科团队进行。这个项目试图回答两个重要的问题。首先,规范和规则是如何形成的?第二,是什么因素导致人们节约或过度开发资源?这项研究对于社会科学家试图理解社会规则和制度的起源和持久性具有重要的理论意义。研究结果还将对资源管理者、立法者和政策制定者产生实际影响。
英文摘要
Dr. James M. Acheson and Dr. Ann Acheson will undertake research on the processes by which rules to regulate natural resources come into being and the reasons they are followed or ignored. Most renewable natural resources are in a state of decline, including fisheries, grasslands, and forests. One reason is that rules and laws to conserve natural resources often fail to work well. This team of researchers will seek to understand the underlying reasons by studying two fisheries in the Gulf of Maine: the lobster industry, where effective rules have been developed and catches are at record highs, and the groundfish industry (which includes such fish as cod and haddock) where catches are at historic low levels and management appears to be ineffective. To study how these two management systems evolved, the project has four related components: (1) a study of the current culture and social organization of these two industries; (2) a historical study designed to understand how a conservation ethic arose in the lobster industry, while groundfishermen are just now beginning to try to conserve; (3) controlled laboratory experimental games done with Maine fishermen to explore when people will constrain their own exploitive efforts; (4) an evolutionary game theory model to integrate findings from the other parts of the project. The project will be carried out by an interdisciplinary team of anthropologists with extensive knowledge of Maine fisheries and fisheries policy, and economists with expertise in game theory. This project seeks to answer two important questions. First, how do norms and rules come into being? Second, what are the factors leading people to conserve or overexploit resources? This research has theoretical importance for social scientists seeking to understand the origins and persistence of social rules and institutions. The research findings also will have practical implications for resource managers, legislators, and policy makers.
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Maine Forest Landowner Study
  • 批准号:
    0449529
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant
  • 资助金额:
    $0.0万
  • 财政年份:
    2005
  • 负责人:
    James Acheson
  • 依托单位:
The Socio-Economic Organization of Business Activity in Cuanajo, Michoacan, Mexico: A Test of the Theories of the Institutional Economists
  • 批准号:
    9024463
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant
  • 资助金额:
    $7.81万
  • 财政年份:
    1991
  • 负责人:
    James Acheson
  • 依托单位:
Social and Cultural Aspects of Fisheries Management in New England Under Extended Jurisdiction
  • 批准号:
    7706018
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant
  • 资助金额:
    $29.83万
  • 财政年份:
    1977
  • 负责人:
    James Acheson
  • 依托单位:
海外基金